In this assignment, you will write an essay on the historical, ever-changing definitions and trends of both domestic and global terrorism among public agencies, private entities, and global organizati

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In this assignment, you will write an essay on the historical, ever-changing definitions and trends of both domestic and global terrorism among public agencies, private entities, and global organizations. Further, evaluate the impact of these changes on domestic and global terrorism.

How has the definition of domestic and global terrorism changed from inception to today among various agencies?

How has the definition of domestic and global terrorism changed among public and private organizations and government agencies?

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Why do so many variations of the definition of domestic and global terrorism exist?

Is a universal definition of terrorism possible? Why, or why not? What are the pros and cons of establishing a universal definition for the world?

Why did the definition of domestic and global terrorism change among all these agencies after the events of 9/11?

Your completed essay should be a minimum of two pages in length, not counting the title and reference pages. All sources used, including the textbook, must be cited and referenced according to APA guidelines.

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In this assignment, you will write an essay on the historical, ever-changing definitions and trends of both domestic and global terrorism among public agencies, private entities, and global organizati
The Non-Random Nature of Terrorism: An Exploration of Where and How Global Trends of Terrorism Have Developed Over 40 Years Sofia Pinero Kluch aand Alan Vaux b aGallup, Inc., Washington, DC, USA; bPsychology Department, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL, USA ARTICLE HISTORYReceived 6 December 2015 Accepted 21 February 2016 ABSTRACTWe examined the geographic concentration and persistence of terrorism using the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD logs all terrorist incidents worldwide using open-source media, and, for 1970– 2013, includes over 125,000 incidents from over 200 countries and territories. We examined regional and country-level data; different terrorismforms, severity levels, and timeframes (entire period,five-year periods, and annual); and multiple definitions of“elevated”terrorism. Thefindings reveal that terrorism is concentrated geographically and temporally. Most countries experience peace or very low levels of terrorism; only a few experience substantial outbreaks; very few experience prolonged terrorism; and even fewer, prolonged severe terrorism. The horror of terrorism shows no signs of abating. In the past year or so, the self-styled Islamic State has captured worldwide attention by complementing conventional military activity with a wave of Internet-publicized beheadings, systematic killing, sexual slavery, forced marriage, coerced religious conversion, abuse of civilians, and destruction of cultural heritage. The 2015 bombing in Bangkok, Thailand, is a stark reminder of the tragic vulnera- bility of a society to an individual or small group willing to leave a bomb in a crowd. So, too, the 2015 attacks in Paris highlight the ubiquity of vulnerable, soft targets in an open society for even modestly skilled and organized terrorists. Despite decades of multidisciplinary research, our understanding of terrorism—its forms, causes, and how best to control it—is still modest. This is less surprising when one appreci- ates the challenges that researchers face in examining this multifaceted, nebulous topic in its diversity of form, scope, actors, targets, motivations, and political context. Scholarship on terrorism involves multiple disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. Theoretical backgrounds, empirical methods, and topical foci are extraordinarily varied. One scholar may seek to untangle the history of a particular terrorist campaign during a specific time frame; another examines methods used by State Department–designated terrorist groups; another seeks to compare terrorism in countries with different types of government; yet CONTACTSofia Pinero Kluch Sofi[email protected] Gallup World Poll, Gallup, Inc., 901 F Street NW, Washington, DC 20004, USA. © Gallup STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 2016, VOL. 39, NO. 12, 1031–1049 another to conduct time-series analysis of the health consequences of terrorist incidents; and so on. Each approach has its strengths and limitations. Our approach here is to paint— through descriptive data, and with a broad brush—the patterns of geographic and temporal concentration of terrorist activity across the world over a four-decade period. We draw broadly on systems and social change theory, particularly processes of innovation and diffu- sion, to understand these patterns. Although a working consensus has emerged among researchers and lawmakers, terrorism is not universally characterized, appraised, or condemned. Our working definition emphasizes intentional or indiscriminate harming of civilians for political objectives. Activities aremost clearly“terrorism”when they produce substantial harm or threat thereof, are perpetrated by an organized group, are part of a sustained program, reflect an indifference to“innocence,” are actively publicized, and involve articulated political objectives. Related activity—sustained organized violence and abuse pursued for nonpolitical objectives (e.g.,“narcoterrorism”), vio- lent oppression of citizens by an established government (e.g.,“state terrorism”), and violence directly or collaterally targeting civilians in the context of a war (e.g.,“strategic bombing”)— are all worthy of study, but in our view are best understood as distinct phenomena. Moreover, terrorism always involves social and political conflicts of interest—whether felt by a tiny sect with an obscure worldview or a substantial portion of the population with a long-standing grievance. It is themeansof seeking to resolve such conflicts that marks terrorism. Finally, our working definition converges well with that of the Global Terrorism Database—the source of data for this study. 1All this said, we recognize that characterization of“terrorism”remains contentious both in the scholarly literature and among the public. Regarding public opinion, a Pew Research Center poll of forty-seven countries found that in eight of them, 70 percent or more of the population thought terrorism a“very big prob- lem,”whereas in another ten countries, 20 percent or less of the population viewed it as such. 2Broadly, populations most concerned with terrorism were those who had prolonged experience of it. Yet, even dramatic terrorist incidents such as the 9/11 attack may be viewed very differently by different groups. In a review of Gallup survey data, the majority of the populations in (only) twenty-nine of thirty-eight countries thought that attacks like 9/11 “cannot be justified at all.”Rejection of this attack was substantially weaker than terrorist attacks generally, ranging widely among countries from 94 percent to 25 percent. 3 As early as 1978, Jenkins 4predicted that, despite its strategic failings, terrorismas a tactic would persist as a means to gain attention, express political grievances, and achieve limited goals. Almost four decades later, the historical record is replete with strategic failures, lost causes, and retired terrorist organizations, yet terrorism is more frequent and more wide- spread than ever—with a growing toll of fatalities and insecurity. It is simply too appealing: Even a resourceful, effective state cannot protect everyone and everything all the time: Open societies, in particular, are so replete with soft targets that even terrorists with limited mate- rial or expertise can quite easily produce noteworthy harm or damage and gain valuable pub- licity for their cause. Interestingly, Jenkins 5also correctly predicted that bombing would remain the most common tactic used by terrorists. Geographic Concentration Acts of terrorism are not randomly distributed across the world’s population. Rather, they appear to occur disproportionately in certain places. Three decades ago, Jenkins 6observed 1032 S. P. KLUCH AND A. VAUX that 60 percent of the world’s terrorism occurred in 10 percent of its countries. Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida 7proposed four patterns for the spatial and temporal distribution of terrorism:Randomness, whereby incidents are distributed randomly.Heterogeneity, whereby countries might show persistent differences in propensity for terrorism.Reinforcement, whereby the occurrence of terrorism in a country increases chances that it will re-occur. Contagion, whereby terrorism might spread across countries, perhaps from more to less dip- lomatically prominent countries 8or from more- to less-developed terrorist groups. 9These proposed patterns set the stage for another question: What might account for geographic concentration? Several factors might be put forward. Rare Events Although terrorism may seem ubiquitous, it is still relatively rare. Is it possible that apparent geographic concentration simply reflects that terrorism—as a rare event—does not occur everywhere all the time? Despite extensive studies of specific conflicts and countries, the per- sistence of the geographic concentration of terrorism regionally and nationally has not been examined thoroughly before. Sparks Maruyama 10 described a systems process that he called deviation amplification. Essentially, this involves an“initial kick”—an event that might seem trivial and random—that triggers change by engaging a positive feedback loop, resulting in sometimes dramatic change. Con- flicts often show this pattern—whether a barfight, a marital squabble, a war, or perhaps ter- rorism. For example,when conditions are ripe, a chance meeting of like-minded activists, a protest that gets out of hand, a particularly harsh security reaction, an ill-timed and provoca- tive policy, or a political scandal, might be all that is needed to ignite a terrorist campaign. From this perspective, terrorism might show geographic concentration, but exactly where it occurs (of perhaps many possible locations) depends on a near-random initial kick. Once it occurs, it is likely to re-occur. Li 11 found such an effect for prior terrorism in countries (although, as with much of the work in this area, the study focused ontransnational terrorism). Political Context Of course, deviation amplification is dependent not just on the initial kick, but on a positive feedback loop. This accounts for escalation. For example, why did the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland explode in violence, but not the Black civil rights movement in the United States on which it was based? Relevant factors might include levels of intergroup hos- tility; real or perceived grievances; limited avenues to express political interests; lack of non- violent means to redress grievances, resolve conflicts, or achieve political goals; civil liberties, press freedom, effectiveness of the state, and severity of state oppression, among others. For example, Li 12 provides an excellent overview of how democracies might affect terror- ism. In a sophisticated empirical study employing multiple control variables, he found that democratic participation reduced the incidence of transnational terrorism in a country. However, governmental constraints (checks and balances) on executive leaders increased the STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1033 incidence of transnational terrorism. Autocratic regimes apparently have a freer hand in countering terrorism without concern for civil liberties and other constraints. The effect of press freedom is subsumed by that of government constraints. Moreover, terrorism was less common in countries with proportional representation systems relative to those with major- itarian or mixed systems. He also replicated priorfindings (through control variables) that transnational terrorism was more common in poor countries, large countries, and those going through regime changes. Interestingly, transnational terrorism is more common in countries with capable governments. Apparently, resources to address terrorism are out- weighed by the prominence of the target. Innovation and Diffusion of Tactics, Strategy, and Ideology In their classic work, Hamblin, Jacobsen, and Miller 13 outlined several processes (described through mathematical models) that underlie social change. Key among these areinnovation (perfection of a basic innovation; cross-fertilization of numerous techniques) anddiffusion (binary adoption—whether a product or technique is adopted by potential users; and use dif- fusion—where degree of use increases or decreases). Hamblin et al. 14 described epochs of innovation in attempted and successful airplane hijackings (1968–1972), as authorities inno- vated countermeasures. They also described innovation in political violence in Latin America through the 1950s and 1960s. A very early example of diffusion was an outbreak of swastika paintings in 1959–1960 15—incidents that received international media attention and diffused worldwide. Specific terrorist techniques have been“invented”and have diffused, including public exe- cutions (lynchings, beheadings), church burnings, plane hijackings, embassy attacks, hos- tage-taking, murders of diplomats, infrastructure sabotage, airplane bombings, nail bombs, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car and truck bombs, backpack bombs, and suicide bombings. Depending on the state of mass media in a country and the complexity of the rel- evant technique, innovations may diffuse through face-to-face contact within trusted social networks or through mass media (e.g., newspapers, TV, or Internet). Thus, innovations may diffuse in a particular place or country, across a region, or worldwide. Recent Islamic State activity indicates how digital media now offer near-global reach. Some innovations show eras of use and then fall out of favor (e.g., airplane hijackings). Heyman and Mickolus 16 pro- posed that diffusion might occurcontagiouslythrough imitation across groups,hierarchically through cooperation among groups, and byrelocationas terrorist groups move across bor- ders. Braithwaite and Li 17 demonstrated that countries in geographic neighborhoods where terrorism occurred (hotspots) were more likely to experience terrorism (again, the focus was on transnational terrorism). More subtle than innovation and diffusion of techniques is that ofideas—ideology, worldviews, and religious extremism, for example. Anarchist, racist, rev- olutionary, and liberation philosophies; reactionary right and extreme leftist thinking; and sectarian and religious narratives have all developed, spread, and likely influenced the occur- rence and geographic concentration of terrorist activity. 18 Culture Culture is a probable distal influence on the processes outlined above and thus on geographic concentration of terrorism. Hofstede 19 proposed a theory of cultural dimensions—reflecting 1034 S. P. KLUCH AND A. VAUX how a population has addressed challenges faced by all cultures—that has emerged as a core organizing framework in cross-national cultural research. A handful of studies examine links between culture and terrorism. Hofstede cited several studies that linked power distance (the extent to which inequality is expected and accepted in a society) to domestic political vio- lence. Other somewhat narrow studies found associations between terrorism and uncertainty avoidance (the degree of discomfort in unstructured situations—often driving rituals, rules, rigidity, traditionalism, and dogmatism) 20 and collectivism (the degree to which individuals are integrated into and defer to family and other groups rather than looking after them- selves). 21 Kluch and Vaux 22 conducted a more comprehensive analysis after outlining how each of four cultural dimensions might promote terrorism. Theirfindings were complicated and did not always replicate prior studies. Terrorism broadly wasnotassociated with any of the cultural dimensions. But more specific forms of terrorism (e.g., those involving fatalities, the proportion of lethal attacks) did relate to cultural dimensions in ways consistent with Hofstede’s theory. Moreover, although majorities in most cultures condemned terrorism, larger segments of more collectivist cultures showed more tolerance of terrorism and more relativetolerance of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (compared with terrorism generally). In short, culture’s role in terrorism—through a number of processes—may shape geographic concen- tration and is worthy of further study. Although Jenkins’s 23 observation on the geographic concentration of terrorism has been often repeated, and Midlarsky et al.’s 24 proposed patterns of terrorism’s spatial and temporal patterns all remain plausible, these issues have not received the empirical attention they deserve. In this study, we seek tofill this gap in knowledge by conducting a thorough analysis of the geographic concentration of terrorism and its persistence over time. We examine ter- rorism broadly, but also specific forms of terrorism and terrorism of varying degrees of severity. We also examine terrorism over a multi-decade period, overfive-year periods, and annually; and we examine terrorism at regional and country levels. Study 1: Geographic Concentration of Terrorism The focus of Study 1 is the geographic concentration of terrorism at the regional and country levels. We made the following prediction: (1) Terrorism is geographically concentrated—it has occurred disproportionately in some regions and countries. This prediction was made for (a) terrorism broadly, (b) specifictypesof terrorist activity, and (c) forms ofsevere terrorism. Method We obtained data for this study from a major archival database: the Global Terrorism Data- base (GTD). The GTD is an archive of information derived from credible open-media sour- ces regarding terrorism around the world, compiled by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland. This database includes information for terrorist events worldwide with entries on up to 133 variables for 125,088 terrorist incidents occurring in 208 countries, territories, or identified geographic areas. 25 The current study used GTD data to examine all terrorist incidents between 1970 and 2013. We examined forms of terrorism through the major GTD categories such as armed assault, bombings, hijackings, and kidnappings. 26 We examined terrorist incidents of STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1035 different severity levels through events involving various casualty levels (e.g., incidents involving ten or more deaths). 27 Analyses used the 13 major geographic regions and the 208 countries and territories included in the GTD. Results All Terrorism As predicted, terrorism is not randomly distributed across the world. Between 1970 and 2013, just two of thirteen world regions accounted for 45 percent of world terrorism inci- dents: South Asia (23 percent) and the Middle East and North Africa (22 percent) (see Table 1). The geographic concentration of terrorist events is also evident at the country level: 76 percent of terrorist incidents occurred in just twenty-one countries (10 percent of those in the database), and nearly a quarter ofallterrorism over this period occurred in just three countries: Iraq (10 percent), India (7 percent), and Pakistan (7 percent) (seeTable 1). Types of Terrorism Terrorism occurs in various forms, and these too are concentrated geographically (see Table 2). Over the four-decade period, 29 percent of infrastructure attacks and 18 percent of assassinations occurred in Western Europe, whereas 27 percent of hostage-taking incidents (both barricades and kidnappings) occurred in South Asia and another 21 percent in South America. In contrast, a substantial portion of armed assaults, assassinations, and bombings occurred in two regions: the Middle East and North Africa (20 percent to 27 percent) and South Asia (19 percent to 25 percent). We further examined the distribution of terrorism typeswithineach region. Although ter- rorism may be rare or common in a region, when it happens, what type of terrorism tends to occur? Each region tended to show one or two“preferred”types of terrorism. Armed assaults and bombings accounted for over half of all terrorism occurring in every region (seeTable 3), and for three-quarters in Central America and the Caribbean (73 percent) and the Middle East and North Africa (79 percent). Other than bombings, Central Asia and Western Europe most often experienced assassinations, while North America and East Asia most often expe- rienced infrastructure attacks. Table 1.Distribution of terrorism across regions and key countries all years 1970–2013. RegionPercentage of global terrorismCountries with 2%+ of world terrorismCountry sum Australasia & Oceania 0% 0% Central America & Caribbean 8% El Salvador (4%), Guatemala (2%), Nicaragua (2%) 8% Central Asia 0% 0% East Asia 1% 0% Eastern Europe 1% 0% Middle East & North Africa22%Iraq (10%), Algeria (2%), Lebanon (2%), Turkey (2%)16% North America 2% USA (2%) 2% Russia & Newly Indep. States 2% Russia (2%) 2% South America 15% Colombia (6%), Peru (5%), Chile (2%) 13% South Asia23%India (7%), Pakistan (7%), Afghanistan (5%), Sri Lanka (2%)21% Southeast Asia 7% Philippines (3%), Thailand (2%) 5% Sub-Saharan Africa 7% South Africa (2%) 2% Western Europe 12% UK (4%, of which Northern Ireland 3%), Spain (3%) 7% 1036 S. P. KLUCH AND A. VAUX Severe Terrorism Terrorist incidents differ dramatically not only in form, but in severity with respect to inju- ries, fatalities, and property damage. During the four-decade period, a substantial portion of terrorist incidents worldwide involved no injuries (66 percent), fatalities (53 percent), or property damage (32 percent), while other incidents were very serious.Minor terrorism incidents—involving property damage (up to $1 million) but no injuries or fatalities—num- bered 13,408, or 11 percent of all incidents between 1970 and 2013. These events were some- what balanced regionally, althoughfive of the thirteen regions—South Asia (21 percent), Western Europe (19 percent), South America (16 percent), the Middle East and North Africa (11 percent), and Central America and the Caribbean (11 percent)—were all a little elevated. In contrast, incidents involving multiple fatalities tended to be highly concentrated.Severe terrorist incidents(with ten or more deaths, ten or more injuries, and property damage; 1.5 percent of all incidents) concentrated heavily in the Middle East and North Africa (45 percent) and in South Asia (30 percent) (seeTable 4).Extreme terrorist incidents(twenty Table 2.Regional distribution of types of terrorism. All regionsAll terrorismArmed assault AssassinationBombing/ explosion Infrastructure HijackingHostage taking 100% 24% 13% 48% 6%<1% 6% Australasia & Oceania 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 0% Central America & Caribbean 8% 15% 8% 6% 6% 6% 10% Central Asia 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% East Asia 1% 0% 0% 0% 3% 4% 0% Eastern Europe 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% Middle East & North Africa 22% 20% 21% 27% 9% 19% 16% North America 2% 1% 1% 2% 11% 4% 2% Russia & Newly Indep. States 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 5% 1% South America 15% 12% 17% 15% 9% 14% 21% South Asia 23% 25% 19% 23% 16% 15% 27% Southeast Asia 7% 9% 5% 5% 8% 6% 7% Sub-Saharan Africa 7% 10% 6% 5% 6% 13% 10% Western Europe 12% 5% 18% 13% 29% 12% 5% Total does not include the 4% of attacks categorized as unarmed assaults, unknown, or other. Table 3.Distributions of types of terrorismwithineach region. Armed assaultAssass- inationBombing/ explosionInfra- structure HijackingHostage taking Other Australasia & Oceania 19% 13% 32% 17% 1% 7% 11% Central America & Caribbean 41% 12% 32% 4% 7% 3% Central Asia 20% 27% 36% 3% 2% 8% 5% East Asia 13% 7% 41% 26% 2% 2% 8% Eastern Europe 24% 8% 54% 6% 2% 5% Middle East & North Africa 22% 12% 57% 2% 4% 2% North America 12% 7% 45% 27% 1% 5% 3% Russia & Newly Indep. States 24% 12% 53% 3% 1% 4% 2% South America 21% 15% 48% 4% 8% 4% South Asia 26% 11% 48% 4% 7% 4% Southeast Asia 33% 10% 38% 8% 6% 4% Sub-Saharan Africa 32% 11% 35% 5% 1% 8% 8% Western Europe 10% 19% 52% 14% 3% 3% Indicates less than 1%. STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1037 or more deaths, twenty or more injuries, and property damage; 0.16 percent of all incidents) were also highly concentrated in the Middle East and North Africa (52 percent) and in South Asia (29 percent). The majority ofsevere terrorist incidents(61 percent) occurred in just four countries: Iraq (34 percent), Pakistan (15 percent), Afghanistan (7 percent), and India (5 percent). The majority ofextreme terrorist incidents(75 percent) occurred in just six countries, with almost 60 percent alone in Iraq and Pakistan: Iraq (42 percent), Pakistan (17 percent), Russia (4 percent), Afghanistan (4 percent), India (4 percent), and Sri Lanka (4 percent). In short, incidents involving multiple casualties were highly concentrated by region and country. Bombings About half of the terrorist incidents between 1970 and 2013 involved explosions, and such bombings accounted for about half of severe incidents (bombings with ten or more deaths, ten or more injuries, some property damage; 0.83 percent of all incidents). Once again, these severe bombing incidentswere geographically concentrated; most (82 percent) were in two regions (49 percent in the Middle East and North Africa and 33 percent in South Asia) (see Table 4). Almost a third of these incidents occurred in Iraq alone (32 percent).Suicide bomb- ings,too, were concentrated, with 91 percent in the two regions noted above, and the major- ity (70 percent) occurring in just three countries: Iraq (38 percent), Afghanistan (20 percent), and Pakistan (12 percent). Over half of severe bombings (ten or more deaths and injuries) were conducted by a suicide bomber; 91 percent of thesesevere suicide bomb- ingsoccurred in the noted two regions (55 percent and 36 percent); and 59 percent occurred in just two countries: 38 percent in Iraq and 21 percent in Pakistan. Bombings and suicide bombings were highly concentrated at the regional and country levels. Proportional Lethality Another aspect of terrorism we examined is the proportion or percentage of terrorist inci- dentswithin a region or countrythat involved deaths. Notably, four regions (including some with low levels of terrorism) show lethality above 50 percent, and another two regions show lethality close to that, indicating that roughly half or more of the terrorist incidents in the region involve fatalities (seeTable 4). To be clear, some of these regions experienced Table 4.Regional distribution ofhigh-casualtyterrorist attacks. “Minor” attacksSevere attacksExtreme attacksSevere bombingsSuicide bombingsProportional lethality % of all terrorist incidents 11% 1.5% 0.16% 0.83% 2.25% 47% Australasia & Oceania 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 22% Central America & Caribbean 11% 5% 2% 1% 0% 46% Central Asia 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 58% East Asia 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% Eastern Europe 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% Middle East & North Africa 11% 45% 52% 49% 55% 56% North America 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 15% Russia & NISs 2% 4% 4% 3% 2% 44% South America 16% 3% 2% 3% 0% 37% South Asia 21% 30% 29% 33% 36% 55% Southeast Asia 7% 3% 1% 4% 1% 49% Sub-Saharan Africa 4% 8% 7% 4% 4% 57% Western Europe 19% 2% 2% 2% 0% 26% 1038 S. P. KLUCH AND A. VAUX relatively few terrorist incidents (e.g., Central Asia and Eastern Europe), but a high percent- age of those that occurred were lethal. A country-level analysis of lethality was revealing: 16 countries had 100 or more terrorist incidents, 60 percent of which involved at least one death. In contrast to Sub-Saharan Africa’s low share of world terrorism, that region contains nine of the sixteen high-lethality countries (including the six highest lethality countries): Rwanda (77 percent), Senegal (74 percent), Uganda (73 percent), Burundi (70 percent), Mozambique (68 percent), Congo (Kinshasa) (68 percent), Sudan (66 percent), Nigeria (62 percent), and Somalia (62 percent). High-lethality countries in other regions were as follows: The Middle East and North Africa—Syria (67 percent), Iraq (66 percent), and Algeria (72 percent); South Asia— Sri Lanka (68 percent) and Afghanistan (69 percent); and Central America—Guatemala (61 percent). Strikingly, 14 percent of 154 incidents in Rwanda each resulted in twenty or more deaths. In short, the lethality of terrorist incidents has been concentrated. The results clearly confirm our predictions: terrorism is geographically concentrated, and particular types of terrorism and forms of severe terrorism even more so. The scope of this concentration goes far beyond Jenkins’s early observations—standing for a four-decade period. Moreover we provide considerably more detail about the types and forms of concen- trated terrorism. Terrorism does not occur at random. Terrorism clearly occurs in specific geographic hot spots—consistent with Midlarsky’s processes of heterogeneity, reinforce- ment, and contagion (Hamblin’s diffusion). The next study—examining change over time— will allow further examination of these processes. Study 2: Change in and Persistence of Terrorism The data presented thus far reveal a considerable geographic concentration of terrorism at the regional and country levels. One objective of this article was to also illustrate that terror- ism has, in some cases persisted over prolonged periods of time, resulting in not only geo- graphic concentration, but a temporal concentration. In study one, analyzing terrorism by type and severity reveals further evidence of geographic concentration. Yet, examining ter- rorism aggregated over the entire four-decade period may blur the picture. In Study 2, we explore terrorism over time—examining the related topics ofepochsof terrorism andpersis- tenceof terrorism. We made the following predictions for Study 2: (1) The geographic con- centration of terrorism shifts over time, such that during the past four decades, those regions and countries experiencing terrorism will show epochs of terrorist activity against a background of peace. (2)Patternsof terrorism vary over time, such that some countries show distinct epochs, while other countries experience prolonged episodes of terrorism. (3) More severe forms of terrorism are particularly concentrated, occurring repeatedly in some countries, while never occurring in other countries. Method The data we used here were also from the GTD. Changes in terrorism over time—epochs and persistence—were examined in several ways: (a) identifying“repeaters”among countries that accounted for most terrorism in given years, (b) providing a narrative of the levels of terrorism (and types of terrorism) that occurred in key regions over ninefive-year periods, (c) examining epochs of terrorism in countries over ninefive-year periods, and STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1039 (d) examining persistence of terrorism in countries over forty-three individual years. The lat- ter part of the study includes analyses of persistence through multiple indicators of terror- ism: years with 1 percent or more of world terrorism,five or more incidents, one or more incidents each involving ten or more deaths, andfive or more bombings. Results Epochs—Terrorism in Select Years First, a simple way of revealing the importance of era—in any given year, most terrorism occurred in just a few countries. Wearbitrarilyselectedfive years (1975, 1985, 1995, 2005, and 2013) across the span of the dataset. (This selection preceded examination of the terror- ism data.) For each of these years, about 50 percent of terrorist incidents occurred in just three to six of the world’s countries (i.e., 1 percent to 2 percent) (seeTable 5). Two points are striking: the degree of geographic concentration in a given year, and the shift over time inwhichcountries show concentrated terrorism. Thus, few countries account for a great deal of terrorism. Most appear just once in the table, showing an epoch of terrorism; yet, some countries reappear, showing epochs lasting one or even two decades—prolonged terrorism. Narrative of Regional Epochs More detailed examination of the data (through tables and graphs that are too space- consuming to be presented here) reveal patterns of regional terrorism that changeover time—that is, peaks in terrorist activity in a region (and usually specific countries) and, at times, changes in the particular types of terrorist events that occur. What follows is a brief narrative of the kinds of terrorism that have occurred, over ninefive-year periods, in the major regions showing terrorism. In Western Europe, terrorism was evident in 1970–1974 (511 assassinations, 384 bomb- ings), increased dramatically in 1975–1979 (over 1,500 bombings, 718 assassinations, 527 infrastructure attacks, and over 500 armed assaults), and slowly declined to a more moderate level thereafter (with 1,399, 1,389, 1,099, 943, 237, and 446 bombings in the sixfive-year periods from 1980 through 2013. There was a parallel decline in assassinations and armed assaults and a revival of infrastructure attacks in 1990–1994). Western Europe is unique among the regions in that while it still has higher and lower points, there is no prolonged period absent of terrorism. Despite persistent activity (at various times by leftist anarchists, Irish and Basque separatists, Algerian independencefighters, and others), and quite a high Table 5.Countries/areas with highest relative incidence of terrorism for specific years. 1975 1985 1995 2005 2013 N. Ireland 22% El Salvador 15% Pakistan 22% Iraq 28% Iraq 24% USA 19% Colombia 13% India 6% India 9% Pakistan 19% Spain 18% Peru 12% Algeria 6% Afghanistan 8% Afghanistan 12% Nicaragua 9% Germany 5% Algeria 6% Chile 8% Colombia 4% Pakistan 6% Burundi 3% TotalD59% TotalD57% TotalD46% TotalD57% TotalD55% 1040 S. P. KLUCH AND A. VAUX rate of bombings, the death toll in Europe has been relatively modest—particularly com- pared with other regions. North America showed relatively modest levels of terrorism in the 1970s, with over 500 bombings and 245 infrastructure attacks in 1970–1974, dropping to 365 and 62 in 1975– 1979. From 1980 on, terrorist incidents continued but at a low level. While data already pre- sented indicate that, generally, fatalities in the United States were few, counting incidents masks one of the most dramatic terrorist events in history: 9/11, with a unique toll of death, injury, and property damage. In the 1980s, terrorism was most evident in Central America and in South America. In Central America, during the peak 1980–1984 period, there were over 2,000 incidents of armed assault, over 1,000 bombings, and more than 500 assassinations. This dropped over a decade with more than 1,000 armed assaults and 1,000 bombings during 1985–1989, about half that in 1990–1994, and then very little terrorism through 2013. Thus, Central America shows a distinct epoch of terrorism in the 1980s. Terrorism in South America followed the pattern of terrorism in Central America, although it was more prolonged and intense, and it showed a shift toward bombings. It was evident in 1980–1984 (1,813 bombings, 834 armed assaults, and 467 assassinations), peaked during 1985–1989 (3,000 bombings, over 1,000 armed assaults, and almost a 1,000 assassina- tions), and then dropped off to a still-high level in 1990–1994 (over 2,000 bombings, 793 armed assaults, and 716 assassinations) before slipping to a relatively low level from the mid-1990s on (although still 250–500 bombings per period). In South Asia, terrorism was relatively low in the 1970s and early 1980s with substantial jumps in 1985–1990 (744 armed assaults, 691 assassinations, and 808 bombings). This was relatively stable for a decade (1990–1995 through 2000–2004), but some forms at least tri- pled in occurrence in 2005–2009 (over 3,000 bombings, over 150 armed assaults, and nearly 600 kidnappings), with some numbers doubling again in the 2010–2013 period to unprece- dented levels (nearly 7,000 bombings, over 3,000 armed assaults, over 500 infrastructure attacks, and almost 1,000 kidnappings). The most lethal terrorism is currently occurring within South Asia. Terrorism simmered in the Middle East and North Africa from as early as 1975–1979 (with 500–1,000 bombings in each of six successivefive-year periods, and 250–940 assassina- tions in each period between 1980 and 1999). Those eras seem peaceful compared with recent ones: There were 4,340 bombings in 2005–2009, 6,560 bombings in 2010–2013, and over 1,000 and 2,000 armed assaults in those periods. These are the highest rates of bomb- ings in the dataset. Moreover, as data presented earlier indicate, the frequency of severe and extreme terrorist incidents in this region, as well as their high lethality, yield a heavy toll in injuries and fatalities. Similar to the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced terrorism since 1985 and is also currently ina dramatic peak of terrorist activity. In the sixfive-year periods between 1980 and 2009,this region has experienced sus- tained low-level bombings (283, 665, 508, 200, 101, and 323), assassinations (mostly 300–1,000), and armed assaults (mostly 200–1,000). Activity escalated dramatically in 2005–2009 (over 1,000 assaults and over 4,000 bombings) and again in 2010–2013 (over 2,000 assaults and 6,500 bombings). As noted earlier, while this region’ sshare of world terrorism incidents has been modest, the lethality of incidents has been extremely high. STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1041 Results thus far indicate a geographic concentration that shifts over time, sometimes with distinct epochs of terrorism and even types of terrorism against a background of peace; sometimes with prolonged episodes—particularly at the regional level. Of course, longer epochs in a region may reflect short but successive epochs in different countries across the region or persistent terrorism in one or more countries. Further analyses examineddegrees of persistenceat the country level, throughfive-year periods and annually. Persistent terror- ism is examined as terrorism that continues over extended periods of time at an elevated level. The rationale behind examining persistent terrorism is the likely prolonged or com- pounded effects of extended and continual terrorism, more so than brief—even dramatic and traumatic terrorism episodes. Epochs in Countries We examined terrorist incidents for ninefive-year intervals 28 between 1970 and 2013at the country leveland highlighted countries with 5 percent or more of the terrorist incidents for any interval. Only twenty countries (less than 10 percent) showed such elevated terrorism duringanyperiod. There were striking peaks (e.g., United States at 33 percent in 1970–1974; Iraq at 27 percent in 2005–2009; Northern Ireland at 26 percent in 1970–1974; El Salvador at 19 percent in 1980–1984; and Pakistan at 18 percent in 2010–2013). Of the twenty coun- tries, seven showed elevated terrorism for just one period, exhibiting distinct epochs against a background of relative peace; another seven for two periods, showing longer epochs. Four countries had elevated terrorism forthreefive-year periods, exhibiting prolonged epochs: El Salvador (6 percent to 18 percent of world terrorism for the period), Iraq (6 percent to 27 percent), Pakistan (10 percent to 18 percent), and Peru (10 percent to 15 percent). Strik- ingly, two countries showed elevated terrorism for six periods, indicating chronic terrorism: Colombia (6 percent to 11 percent) and India (6 percent to 12 percent). Yet,no country showed elevated terrorism for all nine periods, or even eight or seven. Most countries (more than 90 percent) persistently exhibited no or low-level terrorism. Few countries (approxi- mately 10 percent) showedanypeaks of terrorism during the 43-year period. Of these, only a very few countries (less than 3 percent) showed terrorism that persisted over more than a decade. Persistence across Years To more systematically examine levels of persistence in terrorism, we analyzedannualdata. Countries with1 percent or moreof the terrorist activities for that year were highlighted; then the number of years (0 to 43) for which the country showed elevated terrorism was cal- culated. Of 208 countries or territories listed in the GTD, 139 (67 percent) did not meet the 1 percent criterion for elevated terrorism inanyyear. For the remaining 69 countries (33 percent), the range of years with elevated terrorism was 1–40 (of 43 years): 22 countries had 1–5 years with elevated terrorism; 14 countries had 6–10 years; 13 countries had 11–20 years; 10 countries had 21–30 years; and 10 countries had 31–40 years. The 10 countries (or terri- tories) with the highestpersistenceof elevated terrorism were the Philippines, Colombia, Northern Ireland, Spain, the United States, India, Israel, Turkey, Greece, and Lebanon. Not all terrorism is equal in degree, severity, or type. Therefore, we measured additional categories of persistent terrorism by thenumber of years(0–43) in which a country met a cri- terion for elevated terrorism. Three criteria were used: (a) 5 or more terrorist incidents, (b) 1 or more incident involving 10 or more deaths, and (c) 5 or more incidents involving bombs/ 1042 S. P. KLUCH AND A. VAUX explosives. Of 208 countries and regions, 51nevermetanyof the criteria for annual elevated terrorism; 62neverhad 5 or more terrorist incidents in a year; 51neverhad an incident in which 10 or more people died; and 65neverhad 5 or more bombings in a year. On the other hand, 36 countries had 20 or more years in which 5 or more terrorist incidents occurred, 9 had 20 or more years with at least one incident in which 10 or more people died; and 26 had 20 or more years in which 5 or more bombings occurred.Table 6shows the persistence of terrorism, based on all of these criteria, for countries/territories with the most persistence. Note that the three measures do not vary consistently. Strikingly, while the United States and several European countries show many years with 5 or more incidents of terrorism and even many years with 5 or more bombings, they showvery fewyears in which incidents with 10 or more deaths occurred. Once again, the data indicate that terrorism is concentrated: Most countries show persis- tently low levels, only a few show substantial outbreaks of terrorism, a very few show persis- tent elevations of terrorism, and even fewer show persistent elevations of severe terrorism. In summary, the results confirm our predictions. Whether examining terrorism data for regions or countries, select years,five-year periods, or annually, percentage share or absolute numbers, severe incidents or bombings, the data consistently reveal not only geographic concentration but, typically, temporal concentration in epochs of varying duration. Even in countries with high terrorism levels, these epochs end and peace resumes. Yet, in a very few cases, terrorism appears to be a chronic condition. The historic patterns of terrorism over space and time continue to suggest a readiness of terrorism to shift in form, location, and persistence well into the future. Table 6.Persistence of terrorism: Number of years with occurrence of 5Cincidents, 1Cincident with 10C deaths, or 5Cbombings (highest terrorism-persistence countries/regions). # years with 1%C terror incidents# years with 5C terror incidents# years with 1C incidents of 10Cdeaths# years with 5C bombing incidents Afghanistan 17 21 21 19 Algeria 19 22 21 22 Argentina 22 27 5 22 Colombia 39 39 30 37 France 29 36 0 33 Germany 26 32 2 26 Greece 31 38 4 37 India 33 34 30 32 Iran 16 34 16 20 Iraq 18 22 20 19 Israel 32 37 16 36 Italy 21 33 5 28 Lebanon 31 37 18 33 Pakistan 27 29 27 28 Palestinian Territories 26 33 5 28 Peru 23 21 17 17 Philippines 40 38 32 34 Russia 20 21 19 21 South Africa 24 25 11 20 Spain 37 39 4 38 Sri Lanka 24 26 23 23 Thailand 18 26 12 20 Turkey 32 40 17 36 United Kingdom 39 15 11 39 United States 35 43 5 33 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1043 Discussion Patterns in terrorist activity—its form, frequency, and severity within a region, country, or time frame—are clearly evident and can be used to aid researchers’examinations of where, how, and why terrorism proliferates. Although it is essential to study current terrorist organ- izations and methods, discerning past events from the prior forty years allows for a reflection on similarities and differences among the activities of current terrorists and those of twenty, thirty, or forty years ago. The current study further developed the theory that the concentra- tion of terrorism, specific forms of terrorism, and the persistence of terrorist activity over time facilitate adaptations in terrorist activities among more innovative terrorists. Thefindings here are consistent with Jenkins’s 29 early observations. As predicted, terror- ism is heavily concentrated in specific regions and countries. The geographic concentration is substantial, with South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa home to half of all global terrorism during the study period. Specificformsof terrorism too were concentrated: These two regions each accounted for between one-fifth and one-quarter of all armed assaults, political assassinations (including attempts), and bombings. Other types of terror- ism (though less common) concentrated in other regions, including a quarter of infrastruc- ture attacks and afifth of assassinations in Western Europe, and a quarter of hostage- takings in South America and afifth in South Asia. Concentration of forms of terrorism likely reflect resources, skills, and goals of particular terrorist groups operating in a particular culture at a given time. For example, bombing infrastructure may get attention without pro- ducing popular backlash; political assassination targets may be viewed as culpable enemies; or tactics may be simply the best available for those with limited skill or resources. Among different forms of severe terrorism, high-casualtyterrorism was even more con- centrated: about half of severe attacks, extreme attacks, severe bombings, and suicide bomb- ings occurred in the Middle East and North Africa, and about a third of these occurred in South Asia. The combination of high frequency and high lethality of attacks yields a uniquely heavy toll in these regions. The narrative of terrorism in key world regions often revealed even greater concentra- tion—mostly distinct epochs of terrorism lasting one or two decades, usually with growth, peak, and decline, sometimes with particular kinds of terrorism being prominent. The dura- tion of terrorist epochs in a region may reflect several possibilities. These include prolonged terrorism in just one or a few countries in the region, ongoing terrorismthroughoutthe region, or shorter epochs of terrorism in one successive country after another. At any rate, thefindings converge with those of Braithwaite and Li 30 on terrorist hotspots. While a thor- ough historical analysis (e.g., an examination of the innovation of specific techniques and their diffusion within a campaign and across countries and time) is beyond the scope of this article, we hope that historians mightfind the data a valuable prompt for more intensive analysis. Certainly, the patterns of different forms of terrorism evident in regions and over time may well reflect Hamblin et al.’s 31 processes of innovation and diffusion. Relative prevalence of different kinds of terrorism (hostage-taking, infrastructure attacks, bombing, etc.) seems to reflect both regional preferences and changes over time (less hostage-taking, more bomb- ing) that are consistent with diffusion of successive“superior”innovations. Techniques like hostage-taking through airplane hijacking and embassy attacks were early innovations, pop- ular for a period, but now rare. Targeting infrastructure has been much more prevalent in 1044 S. P. KLUCH AND A. VAUX Europe than elsewhere. Bombing and armed assaults have diffused everywhere. Suicide bombing occurs almost exclusively in the Middle East and South Asia, the vast majority in just three countries. Notable are changes to techniques. On 9/11, Al Qaeda hijacked planes, not to take hos- tages, but to crash-bomb prominent, heavily populated buildings. More generally, bombing has evolved as a tactic. In 1970–1974, Northern Ireland (with a population of about 1.8 mil- lion) accounted for 26 percent of world terrorist events: Although bombings were extremely common, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) often gave warnings, and fatalities wererelatively small. On Bloody Friday, 32 the Provisional IRA exploded 19 bombs in 80 minutes in Belfast, with a toll of nine killed and 130 injured. These incidents were horrific but mild in fatalities compared with current bombing campaigns in Iraq and elsewhere. Returning to severe forms of terrorism, a further example of diffusion is evident in our findings on proportional lethality. Terrorism of a distinct form seems to have diffused in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is relatively rare, but when it occurs, it is disproportionately likely to result in deaths: The region contained nine of the sixteen highest-lethality countries. If ter- rorism were to become more prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa, it could outpace the high fatality rates of terrorism seen in the Middle East and North Africa and South Asia. Thefindings on concentration of terrorism over space and time may reflect the processes proposed by Mickolus and Heyman. 33 These are diffusion through imitation of techniques (contagion), such as roadside IEDs or suicide bombs; through cooperation among groups (hierarchical), such as the many divisions of Al Qaeda—specifically at its peak of operations; or through movement offighters or skilled bombmakers across borders (relocation), such as the physical movement and activity of the Islamic State across Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Geographic concentration was even more striking at the country level—again, plausibly the result of innovation and diffusion. Notably, three-quarters of all terrorist incidents over the study period occurred in just twenty-one countries, and nearly a quarter occurred in just three countries: Iraq, Pakistan, and India. These three countries plus Afghanistan accounted for the majority (61 percent) of severe terrorist attacks, and Iraq and Pakistan alone accounted for 60 percent of extreme terrorist incidents. The concentration of high-casualty incidents is dramatic and provides ample ground for investigating the emergence and spread of terrorist ideologies, personnel, and tactics through innovation, contagion, hierarchical, and relocation mechanisms. The current study moved from concentration of terrorism in space to concentration in time. Examining the temporal patterns of terrorism proved revealing in certain ways. First, in each offive (arbitrarily selected) years across the 1970–2013 period, about half of all ter- rorist incidents occurred in just three to six countries. So, the concentration of terrorism is evident over four decades, long beyond Jenkins’s observation. It is neither unique to the 1980s when Jenkins made the observation, nor a new reality shouldered by the Middle East, but rather a process long-seeded over the past four decades. Findings from several different perspectives on epochs and persistence of terrorism yielded a consistent picture. Most countries (over 90 percent) showed no or very low levels of terrorism during the four decades, and two-thirds failed to meet a criterion for elevated terrorism (1 percent or more of world terrorism) foranyof the 43 years. Only six countries showed elevated terrorism (5 percent or more of world terrorism) for more than two of nine five-year periods: Iraq, Pakistan, El Salvador, and Peru (three periods) and India and Colom- bia (six periods). Of 25 countries that met at least one criterion for elevated terrorism STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1045 (1 percent or more, 5 or more incidents, 5 or more bombings, or 1 or more incidents with 10 or more deaths) for each of 20 or more years, all six European countries, plus the United States, South Africa, and Palestinian Territories, showed relatively few years (less than 12) of incidents with 10 or more deaths. Thefindings reveal that terrorism is concentrated geo- graphically and temporally, and severe terrorism even more so. Most countries experience peace or extremely low levels of terrorism; only a few experience substantial outbreaks of ter- rorism; very few experience prolonged terrorism; and even fewer see prolonged severe ter- rorism. The concentration is considerably greater than that observed by Jenkins. In Midlarsky et al.’s 34 framework, wefind no evidence for random spatial and temporal distribution of terrorism. There would seem to be ample evidence for reinforcement and contagion. Further, heterogeneity—whereby some countries show persistent differences in propensity for terrorism—seems plausible. The political and cultural factors that might underlie such propensity are being examined, 35 but it is unlikely that they are easily modi- fied. That said, most regions and countries—even ones that have experienced intense, and in some cases prolonged, terrorist campaigns—do achieve peace. Terrorism is concentrated geographically and temporally. However, the concentrations tend to shift, such that no country experiences perpetual terrorism, but rather epochs of ter- rorism, sometimes diffusing to the region. Causes emerge, diffuse, and fade. New techniques are developed, adopted, and improved—proving more or less effective at yielding desired outcomes. Some terrorist organizations are ineffective. Others may articulate and broadcast a cause; recruit successfully; adopt, adapt, and innovate effective techniques; and sustain an entrepreneurial organization with a recognized and dreaded brand. The history of terrorism suggests that hotspots will continue to shift and techniques will continue to evolve, but the dynamic processes underlying this change may be understood. By recognizing and clarifying these processes, researchers may be able to better track and predict terrorist hotspots and epochs and facilitate countermeasures. The current study was supported by a rich dataset, the GTD, comprising over forty years of data on terrorist incidents. As with most rich longitudinal archives, the GTD brings both strengths and weaknesses. For present purposes, strengths include geographical scope (208 countries and territories), the time span (1970–2013), data on multiple forms of terrorist activity, and data on casualties allowing differentiation of more severe terrorism. Weaknesses include the near-inevitable changes in definitions and methods of data collection over the years. This can create problems with examining trends over time. 36 As the current study examined overall occurrences and occurrences at specific points of time, this limitation was not critical. Another weakness (theflip side of a strength) is the sheer quantity of data, in which no single strategy or method stands out as perfect. Thus, we opted for multiple approaches, seeking to replicatefindings. For example, we examined regional and country- level data, differentformsof terrorism, differentlevelsof severity, and different timeframes (entire period,five-year periods, and annual), and we used multiple definitions of“elevated” terrorism. Fortunately,findings were generally consistent. The high volume of data pre- cluded several options for further analysis. For example, we opted for a brief narrative sum- mary of epochs of terrorism in the major regions, rather than attempting a more detailed analysis (e.g., specific types/severity of terrorism over years across countries) that might have shed more light on innovation and diffusion processes. The broad nature of this research provides a novel view of historical data, albeit with the obvious limitations of breadth over depth. The article did not seek to, or provide, detailed event-, conflict-, or 1046 S. P. KLUCH AND A. VAUX actor-specific insights as the goal was instead to illustrate the non-random persistent, yet shifting, nature of terrorism. This research raises many questions for future studies. What underlies the geo- graphic and temporal concentrations of terrorism observed here? What acute political and social events constitute initial kicks that might lead to terrorist campaigns? What political and cultural conditions favor deviation amplification, resulting in an intense epoch of terrorism rather than short-lived unrest? What conditions shorten or prolong epochs? What conditions promote innovation of terrorist techniques and favor adop- tion of more intense, severe, or lethal terrorist tactics? The Islamic State has pushed many of the boundaries that up to now have been recognized even by terrorists. Is it inevitable that at least some terrorist organizationswillrampuptomoreandmore lethal techniques? Notes 1.For this study, the main source of data is the Global Terrorism Database (Datafile: globalterror- ismdb_0814dist, available at, a tool that defines terrorist incidents as“the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a politi- cal, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.”This definition specifically excludes state terrorism, incidents without violence (or the threat of violence), and accidents—terrorist activity must be intentional. There are three criteria used in inclusion of an incident as terrorism. An event must meet two of the criteria for inclusion. Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal. Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audi- ence (or audiences) than the immediate victims. Criterion 3: The action must be outside the con- text of legitimate warfare activities. Admittedly broad, this definition narrows the definition of terrorism and differentiates it from state action, broader internal conflict, or transnational warfare. 2.Data from analyses in the Council on Foreign Relations Report,“Public Opinion on Global Issues: A New Digest of International and U.S. Attitudes”(2010), Chapter 4A World Opinion on Terror- ism. Available at (accessed 27 November 2015); Pew data summarized in the Council on Foreign Relations Report,‘‘Public Opinion on Global Issues: A New Digest of International and U.S. Attitudes”(2010), Chapter 4A World Opinion on Terror- ism. Available at (accessed 27 November 2015); World Public Opinion 2008 data summarized in Council on Foreign Relations Report,“Public Opinion on Global Issues: A New Digest of International and U.S. Attitudes”(2010), Chapter4A World Opinion on Terrorism. Available at (accessed 27 November 2015). 3.Sofia Pinero Kluch and Alan Vaux,“Culture and Terrorism: The Role of Cultural Factors in Worldwide Terrorism (1970–2013),”Terrorism and Political Violence(2015), pp. 1–19. 4.Brian Michael Jenkins,“International Terrorism: Trends and Potentialities,”Journal of Interna- tional Affairs32(1) (1978), pp. 115–123. 5.Ibid. 6.Brian M. Jenkins,“Terrorism Prone Countries and Conditions,”in A. Merari, ed.,On Terrorism and Combating Terrorism(Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1985), pp. 25–40. 7.M. I. Midlarsky, Martha Crenshaw, and Fumihiko Yoshida,“Why Violence Spreads: The Conta- gion of International Terrorism,”International Studies Quarterly24(2) (1980), pp. 262–298. 8.Ibid. 9.Edward Heyman and Edward Mickolus,“Observations on‘Why Violence Spreads,”International Studies Quarterly(1980), pp. 299–305. STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1047 10.Magoroh Maruyama,“The Second Cybernetics: Deviation-Amplifying Mutual Causal Processes,” American Scientist51(2) (1963), pp. 164–179. 11.Quan Li,“Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?”Journal of Conflict Resolution49(2) (April 2005), pp. 278–297.PsycINFO, EBSCOhost(accessed 19 November 2015). 12.Ibid. 13.Robert Lee Hamblin, Ralph Brooke Jacobsen, and Jerry L. L. Miller,A Mathematical Theory of Social Change(Wiley-Interscience, 1973). 14.Ibid. 15.Caplovitz and Rogers (1961), cited in Hamblin et al.,A Mathematical Theory of Social Change. 16.Edward Heyman and Edward Mickolus,“Imitation by Terrorists—Quantitative Approaches to the Study of Diffusion Patterns in Transnational Terrorism,”in Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason, eds.,Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism(New York: Pergamon Press, 1981). 17.Alex Braithwaite and Quan Li,“Transnational Terrorism Hot Spots: Identification and Impact Evaluation,”Conflict Management and Peace Science24(4) (2007), pp. 281–296. 18.B. M. Jenkins,“Terrorism and Beyond: A 21st Century Perspective,”Studies in Conflict & Terror- ism24(5) (2001), pp. 321–327. 19.Geert Hofstede,Culture’s Consequences:International Differences in Work-Related Values(Bev- erly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1980). 20.Robert M. Wiedenhaefer, Barbara Riederer Dastoor, Joseph Balloun, and Josephine Sosa-Fey, “Ethno-Psychological Characteristics and Terror-Producing Countries: Linking Uncertainty Avoidance to Terrorist Acts in the 1970s,”Studies in Conflict & Terrorism30(9) (2007), pp. 801– 823. 21.Robert D. Davis, Community Value Above Individualism: A Common Cultural Element in Mod- ern Suicide Bombers, No. AU/ACSC/DAVIS/AY09. AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLL MAXWELL AFB AL, 2009. Available at metadataP refixDhtml&identifierDADA539970, p. 825; Daniela Peterka-Benton and Bond Benton,“Effects of Cultural Collectivism on Terrorism Favorability,”Journal of Applied Security Research9(1) (2014), pp. 17–40. 22.Pinero Kluch and Vaux,“Culture and Terrorism.” 23.Jenkins,“Terrorism Prone Countries and Conditions.” 24.Manus I. Midlarsky, Martha Crenshaw, and Fumihiko Yoshida,“Rejoinder to Observations on ‘Why Violence Spreads,’”International Studies Quarterly(1980), pp. 306–310. 25.The Global Terrorism Database actually lists countries, territories, and identified geographic areas. For brevity, the term“countries”is used here. 26.Forms of terrorist attacks from the Global Terrorism Database codebook are as follows: Assassi- nation—An act whose primary objective is to kill one or more specific prominent individuals, does not include attacks on non-specific members of a targeted group. Armed Assault—An attack whose primary objective is to cause physical harm or death directly to human beings by use of a firearm, incendiary or sharp instrument. Bombing/Explosion—An attack where the primary effects are caused by an energetically unstable material undergoing rapid decomposition and releasing a pressure wave that causes physical damage to the surrounding environment. Hijack- ing—An act whose primary objective is to take control of a vehicle such as an aircraft, boat, bus, and so on for the purpose of diverting it to an un-programmed destination, force of the release of prisoners, or some other political objective. Hostage-Taking—An act whose primary objective is to take control of hostages for the purpose of achieving a political objective through concessions or through disruption of normal operations. Facility/Infrastructure Attack—An act, excluding the use of explosive, whose primary objective is to cause damage to a non-human target, such as a building, monument, train, pipeline, and so on. Unarmed Assault—An attack whose primary objective is to cause physical harm or death directly to human beings by any means other than explosives,firearms, incendiary, or sharp instrument. Unknown—the attack type cannot be deter- mined from available information. 27.Note that deaths of the terrorists are included in the death count. 1048 S. P. KLUCH AND A. VAUX 28.The nine periods included two four-year periods 2010–2013 (four years) and 1990–1995 (data missing for 1993). 29.Jenkins,“Terrorism Prone Countries and Conditions.” 30.Braithwaite and Li,“Transnational Terrorism Hot Spots.” 31.Hamblin, Jacobsen, and Miller,A Mathematical Theory of Social Change. 32.BBC History,“Bloody Friday, Belfast.”Available at friday_belfast (accessed 24 November 2015). 33.Edward Mickolus and Edward Heyman,“Iterate: Monitoring Transnational Terrorism,”Behav- ioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism(New York: Pergamon 1981), pp. 153–174. 34.Midlarsky, Crenshaw, and Yoshida,“Rejoinder to Observations on‘Why Violence Spreads.’” 35.Li,“Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?”; Kluch and Vaux, “Culture and Terrorism.” 36.Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan,“Introducing the Global Terrorism Database,”Terrorism and Political Violence19(2) (2007), pp. 181–204. STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1049 Copyright ofStudies inConflict &Terrorism isthe property ofRoutledge anditscontent may not becopied oremailed tomultiple sitesorposted toalistserv without thecopyright holder’s express writtenpermission. However,usersmayprint, download, oremail articles for individual use.

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