Module 5 Assignment 1
In Module 1, you began by brainstorming research topics and you submitted your research topic for approval. Once the topic was approved, you began working toward your final research proposal. The structure of the research report is simple and almost the same as the structure of the research itself. The purpose of the report is to inform the reader about the problem investigated, the methods used to solve the problem, the results of the investigation, and the conclusions inferred from the results. The function of the report is not to convince the reader of the virtue of the research but to expeditiously and as clearly as possible report what was done, why it was done, how it was done, and what was concluded. The research report should always be written so readers can draw their own conclusions about the adequacy of the research and the validity of the reported results and conclusions. The ultimate test of a research report is its ability to be replicated. If this criterion cannot be met, the report is inadequate. Although it is not always easy to develop and write a research report, there should be constant revision and consistent effort toward organization. You, the writer, must always be aware that deleting circumlocutions, redundancies, and other “verbal fat” is a necessity. Go over the report to achieve greater simplicity, clarity, and brevity and fulfill the obligation to give criticism the serious, careful, and objective attention it deserves. Now that the course is coming to an end, there must be a time for deliberate and candid self-reflection on the journey you have just made. The area of research methodology and statistics, regardless of the research venue, is a difficult one to master. However, all learning must have a beginning. All learning should be purposeful and goal oriented. All learning should advance you to another level of thinking and add to your personal knowledge base. When reviewing what you have covered in Modules 1 through 4, you will probably realize there were personal highlights and even situations of frustration. You will also realize your efforts have made you more appreciative of what research offers to the discipline of behavioral sciences. However, no matter how much content a person can absorb, how much critical thinking can be done, and how much knowledge can be brought to the forefront, one final professional research initiative must be addressed, namely ethics. In this last module, in addition to developing your final research proposal, you will be looking at ethics and diversity within the context of research. Ethics is defined as having three components: respect for the person, beneficence, and justice. For students at all levels, the habit of applying ethics depends on the development of moral sensibilities and critical reasoning and on an approach to problem solving, honing in on both reason and practice. For students in the behavioral sciences, therefore, ethical decision making is essential to proper conduct when conducting research. The Four Principles One way to understand the implications or consequences of ethics is to know that moral action (ethics) is determines by four principles: Moral sensitivity (the ability to understand moral content when present in a situation) Moral judgment (the ability to recognize what is the moral thing to do) Moral motivation (the ability to do what is actually moral rather than what other values dictate) Moral character (the qualities of the strength of ego, perseverance and the courage to act) The implication here is that for all students who practice the four principles, the consequence is clear—all life’s important problems are dealt with positively by an individual who is in harmony with the self and the community. The end result is the development of a healthy personality and a moral framework guiding research endeavors along a clear path—one not bound by self-interest. Learning Outcome Describe the role of the forensic mental health professional in research. Articulate and apply knowledge related to ethical and cultural factors which might affect the conduct, design, and interpretation of research. Discuss the importance and methods of designing valid and reliable research in the behavioral sciences. Examine the implications for evidence-based practice for the forensic mental health professional. Discuss issues related to the calculation, analysis, interpretation, and reporting of statistical output. Identify and apply appropriate ways in which research information may be disseminated.
Module 5 Assignment 1
The Internal Review Board Some of you may be familiar with the Milgram obedience study of the 1960s. In this well-known study, the social researcher Milgram led participants to believe that they were delivering to an actual person shocks so severe as to incapacitate the person. Many of the participants experienced undue stress as a result of thinking that their actions had inflicted severe pain on someone. Their distress was exacerbated by the fact that Milgram would not allow them to stop participation even when participants pleaded with him to end the study. He kept reciting the line, “The experiment must go on.” He was studying obedience in a post–World War II America, and the results that he obtained were as shocking as his methods. Many of the participants continued delivering electric shocks up to and beyond the point where the perceived victim was completely unresponsive. The Milgram obedience study was a significant inspiration for the inception of the internal review board (IRB). The IRB (sometimes also referred to as the institutional review board) is an internal agency that every institution (public or private) must have if it conducts any type of research involving participants or animals. Places that typically have IRBs are hospitals and universities. Currently, no one in this country can conduct a research study without proper IRB approval. The role of the IRB is to protect potential research participants to ensure that they are treated humanely and respectfully throughout the research process so that they are not subject to stressful experiences unnecessarily. The IRB is not concerned with assisting researchers in pursuing research. Their only concern is ensuring rights and safety of the participants. Researchers must also take that into account when designing their studies because IRB approval is essential. Without the IRB’s approval, the research study cannot take place. The IRB requires that every research participant provide what is termed “informed consent.” The informed consent process provides participants with clear information about all expectations related to their participation. They need to be given clear information about what they are being asked to do so that they can make an informed decision on whether or not to participate. Most importantly, the informed consent process must let participants know that they can withdraw from participation at any time for any reason, without penalty. Often, the IRB requires researchers who offer compensation to participants to compensate participants fully even if they withdraw early. Participants must also be informed that their results will be reported in aggregate (group) form, meaning that participants will be kept anonymous and that their responses will not be singled out. Access the Institutional Review Board Handbook. (I will email this to you) Specifically look at the Criteria for IRB Certification of Research Project (pp. 16–20).
Module 5 Assignment 1
Use of Deception in Research Some might think that because of the IRB deception cannot be used in research. However, this is not the case. In fact, most studies use some element of deception in that they do not inform the participants of the specific hypotheses or all aspects of the topic. Mild deception is particularly useful in cases where information about the true nature of the study might alter the participants’ behavior. For example, if a researcher wanted to conduct a study on racial bias, mentioning that topic to participants might influence how they decide to behave during the study or what they would report about themselves. Instead, the experimenter would need to describe the study vaguely, such as saying that the study is about exploring interpersonal relationships, so that the experimenter can obtain the most accurate information about participants’ thoughts and behavior. Although deception is permitted within research, the benefit of the desired information must outweigh the potential risks that can occur from the deception. For example, you would not be permissible to deceive participants by falsely telling them that a loved one is deceased in order to study grief reactions. Any information gleaned on grief reactions would not be worth the emotionally difficult experience for participants of thinking that they have lost someone close to them. Further, deception is only permitted in cases where other ways of obtaining that information are not possible. In the case of studying grief reactions, it is certainly quite possible to study naturally occurring grief reactions without having to artificially create the circumstances. When deception is used, participants must be debriefed upon the conclusion of their participation in the study. In the debriefing process, participants should be told about the nature of the deception and the reason for it. In the unlikely case where they experience adverse reactions as a result of having been deceived, it is recommended for a researcher to be prepared with names of local therapists who have agreed to provide an hour of free counseling for such participants. However, such adverse reactions are unlikely because severe deception that is likely to cause participants to become emotionally distraught would not be permitted by the IRB. Read the following article from the online library resources When Is Deception in Research Ethical?
Module 5 Assignment 1
P APERS When is deception in research ethical? Nafsika Athanassoulis*and James Wilson † *Centre for Professional Ethics, Chancellor’s Building, Keele University; †Comprehensive Biomedical Research Centre and Centre for Philosophy, Justice and Health, University College London, UK E-mail: [email protected] Abstract This article examines when deceptive withholding of information is ethically acceptable in research. The rst half analyses the concept of deception. We argue that there are two types of accounts of deception: normative and non-normative, and argue that non-normative accounts are preferable. The second half of the article argues that the relevant ethical question which ethics committees should focus on is not whether the person from whom the information is withheld will be deceived, but rather on the reasonableness of withholding the information from the person who is deceived. We further argue that the reasonableness of withholding information is dependent on the context. The last section examines how the context of research should shape our judgements about the circumstances in which withholding information from research participants is ethically acceptable. We argue that some important features of research make it more dif cult to justify withholding information in the context of research than elsewhere. Introduction One of a Research Ethics Committee’s main tasks is to ensure that potential research participants are in a position to give valid consent. Research participants cannot give consent without adequate information, and so ethics com- mittees typically spend much of their time scrutinising the information to be provided to research participants. Information provision in research is an especially sensitivetopic because of the uncertainty inherent in research, the dif culty of balancing the relevant harms and bene ts, and the fact that research often exposes participants to risk without any compensating bene t. There are a number of standard problems with inform- ation provision in research, such as ensuring information is provided in a manner which enhances understanding, and how to overcome dif culties in understanding the concept of randomization. In this article we shall set all these pro- blems aside, and concentrate on cases where a researcher wants to withhold information from the research partici- pants on methodological grounds. If some relevant inform- ation is not communicated in the types of case we are interested in, this is not because of a mistake or incompe- tence, but rather because the information is withheld intentionally. In the light of scandals such as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, and Milgram’s obedience to authority experiments, Research Ethics Committees are often very reluctant to allow research which they believe to involve deception to go ahead. However there are certain kinds of research that cannot be done without deception: in some instances providing certain kinds of information about the study will invalidate the results, as it may lead to the participants modifying their behaviour in light of this knowledge. To take just one example, research into socially disliked atti- tudes can usually not proceed without some form of decep- tion. Clearly you will not gain a true insight into the extent of discrimination against people with mental health problems if you inform your research subjects that Nafsika Athanassoulisis a Lecturer in Ethics at Keele University, Director of the MA in the Ethics of Cancer and Palliative Care and Coordinator of the Professional Doctorate in Medical Ethics. She has diverse research interests and has published on Aristotle, virtue ethics, moral luck, consent, the doctor – patient relationship, the education of health-care professionals and making decisions about risk. She is the author ofMorality, Moral Luck and Responsibility: Fortune’s Weband the editor ofPhilosophical Re ections on Medical Ethicsand, with Sam Vice, The Moral Life: Essays in Honour of John Cottingham. James Wilsonis Lecturer in Philosophy and Health at University College London, where he is attached to the Comprehensive Biomedical Research Centre and the Centre for Philosophy, Justice and Health. Previously he spent four years (2004 – 2008) as a Lecturer in Ethics at the Centre for Professional Ethics, Keele University. His main research interests are in public health ethics, research ethics and the regulation of intellectual property. Recently he has been working on methodology in normative thinking – in particular the role of re ective equilibrium in ethical thinking, the way that heuristics and biases shape our moral intuitions, what bioethicists can learn from political philosophers and what political philosophers should learn from bioethicists. He is joint coordinator of the International Association of Bioethics’s Philosophy and Bioethics Network (INPAB). Clinical Ethics2009;4:44–49DOI: 10.1258/ce.2008.008047 this is what you are researching, given that people are typi- cally reticent about admitting to attitudes which are subject to social disapproval. As the kinds of information that can be discovered by such deceptive studies can be very useful, it seems too extreme to claim that deception in research canneverbe justi ed. But as often in ethics the dif cult question is where to draw the line. In this article we look in detail at two cases of possible research designs – one of which we think falls on the right side of the line of ethical acceptability, and the other on the wrong side – and by re ecting on these two cases, formulate a principle to help guide judgements about when deceptive withholding of information is ethically acceptable in research. We begin, however, by analysing the concept of deception. We argue that there are two types of accounts of deception: normative and non-normative accounts. Normative accounts of deception make the ethical ques- tion of whether a particular case of misleading is justi ably integral to the question whether it counts as a case of deception, while non-normative accounts do not. We argue that non-normative accounts are preferable. More speci cally, we argue that where A intends to mislead B, and succeeds in so doing, this is a case of deception irres- pective of whether this misleading is ethically justi able and so the claim that ethical justi ability should play a role in the de nition of deception is false. If this non- normative account of deception is correct, then it is a mistake for ethics committees to set too much store by the question of whether a given research project involves deception, given that the fact that a piece of research involves deception does not in and of itself make it morally problematic. The second half of the article argues that what ethics committees should be focusing on in cases of withholding information is the reasonableness of withholding the inform- ation from the person who is deceived, and that the reasonableness of withholding information is dependent on the context. The last section examines how the context of research should shape our judgements about the circumstances in which withholding information from research participants is ethically acceptable. We argue that some important features of research make it more dif cult to justify withholding information in the context of research than elsewhere. When is withholding information deceptive? In an interesting recent article analysing the concept of deception, Sokol argues that there is an asymmetry between misleading by intentionally giving false inform- ation, and misleading by intentionally withholding information. The former is always deceptive, while whether the latter counts as deceptive depends on what expectations would be reasonable in the circumstances. Sokol argues for this claim as follows: ‘At any one time, people hold hundreds of false beliefs. They do not,however, expect others to correct them unless there is good reason to do so. Just as we hold many false beliefs about the world, so do we withhold true beliefs from others. Because there is generally no expectation to reveal those true beliefs, it would be odd to say we are con- cealing them from others, let alone that we are deceiving them.’ 1 Sokol draws the conclusion that whether withholding information is deceptive in a given circumstance depends on three things: (a) the agent’s intention; (b) what expect- ations would be normatively reasonable in the circum- stances; and (c) whether the attempted deception is successful. Hence, he argues that I can deliberately set out to mislead you about whether I have a particular book by hiding it when you come round to my house, and even if I am successful in misleading you, this will still not count as deception if your expectation that I would tell the truth about the contents of my book collec- tion were normatively unreasonable. 1 We have two worries about this account of deception by omission. First, it gains much of its plausibility by running together cases where someone withholds inform- ation with the intention that another person will form a false belief, and cases where information is withheld, but where there is no intention that the other person form or retain a false belief. In the latter category, someone could condone the fact that another person was fairly likely to form (or maintain) a false belief without it being theirintentionthat the other person do so. Suppose the man next to me on the bus has spinach stuck to his tooth, and I do not mention this to him, as he is a perfect stranger and I do not want to embarrass him. In these circumstances, I may keep quiet with the intention of not embarrassing him, being aware that he may well draw the conclusion that there is nothing amiss about his appearance. We agree with Sokol that in cases such as this I do not deceive the stranger. But the reason that my silence is not deceptive need not be that there was no reasonable expectation that I mention the spinach; it could equally well be claimed that the reason I do not deceive the stranger is that I do not intend to mislead him. It follows that cases of this kind do little to support the claim that deception by omission requires that the speaker have a reasonable expectation that the truth will be told in the circumstances. Second, we think that intentional withholding of information can still be deceptive, even if there would be no normatively reasonable expectation that the person withholding the information would reveal what they know in the given context. Take the following case. Harry Harry is a gifted sleight-of-hand magician, who happens to work in a coffee shop. When a customer asks for a glass of water, he likes to pour them the glass in plain view, and then using sleight of hand, replace this glass with another identical glass of water, which he poured a few moments before and cunningly concealed about his When is deception in research ethical?45 Clinical Ethics 2009 Volume 4 Number 1 person. The customer is in no way harmed by Harry’s sleight of hand, as the two glasses of water are equivalent in every way. The rst thing to say is that Harry does nottellthe cus- tomer that the glass of water she receives is the same as the one she initially sees; rather he is relying on the customer’s natural assumption that the glass of water she receives is one and the same as the one she saw being poured. So if this is a case of deception, it is a case of deception by omis- sion, rather than commission. We take it that the fact that the glass of water that the customer sees is a different glass of water from the one that she in fact receives is not a piece of information which is material to her desire to have a glass of water. And it seems hard to see that a reasonable person would have reason to object to the fact that they are not given the actual glass of water they saw being poured, but rather an identical one. 2 We think that in this case Harrydoesdeceive the cus- tomer, even though the fact that the glass of water is a different one from the one the customer saw is not relevant to the ful lment of the customer’s desire for the glass of water. In other words, Harry deceives the customer despitethe fact that there would not be a reasonable expect- ation for him to tell the customer that the glass of water she receives is not the original one she saw, but rather an identical one. If this analysis of the case of Harry the magician is correct, then it suggests that intentionally causing someone to hold a false belief is a suf cient condition for deception, whether or not the information about which the person is misled about is information that they had a reasonable expectation of being told. If this is the case, then it is false to argue that it is a necessary con- dition for deception by omission that the person who is deceived has a reasonable expectation of receiving the information that is withheld from them. We also think that there is a second type of case which reveals a problem with normative conceptions of decep- tion like Sokol’s, namely where a person is engaged in action which is so immoral that they could not reasonably expect someone to help them achieve their goal. If a mur- derer comes to the door, and asks whether his innocent target is hiding inside, then certainly I should attempt to bring it about that the murderer does not believe that that the innocent person is hiding inside. But we are not at all sure that the would-be murderer has anything like a normatively reasonable expectation that I should reveal what I know to him. Hence it looks like on Sokol’s account I probably do not deceive him if I send him away with an intentionally misleading statement. But this seems counter-intuitive to us. We think that these two problems suggest that a non- normative conception of deception is preferable. On a non-normative conception of deception, to call something deceptive is not in and of itself to make a moral judgement about the conduct. Hence on such a view, saying that a piece of research involves deceiving the research partici- pants is not yet to make a moral claim about the research. While we do not think that the idea of reasonableexpectations is helpful in thinking about what deception is, it will form a key part of our account of why some cases of deception are more ethically problematic than others. With this in mind, let us pass on to analyse our two cases about withholding information in research. Two cases of withholding information in research We have used the following two cases in ethics training for Research Ethics Committees as part of the Centre for Professional Ethics’s Knowledge Transfer activities. Bamforthis ctional, whereasRucolais a modi ed version of a real case reported by a participant in one of our train- ing days.Rucolawas turned down by the Research Ethics Committee on the grounds that it deceived the subjects as to the true nature of the trial. We shall be suggesting that the committee in question made the wrong decision, and for the wrong reason. Bamforth John Bamforth is an internationally recognized expert in human communication studies. He approaches you, prior to seeking ethics committee approval, to see if you (and your Cancer Care Centre) would be willing to participate in his newest study. He is interested in discovering the techniques by which health-care professionals attempt to break bad news; and he hopes that the results of his research will in the future help to improve best practice in this dif cult area. For his latest research project, he pro- poses to set up a relatively unobtrusive unattended camera in the room in which the health-care professional breaks the bad news to the patient. He will analyse the communi- cation (both what is said and what is unsaid), and the body language of both participants, and write a number of papers on the subject of the best way to break bad news. He proposes to seek consent from all the health-care professionals to be involved in the study, and also all the patients. He does not want to scare the patients before- hand, so he will tell them merely that he is interested in how doctors talk to patients, and will not speci cally mention the issue of breaking bad news. All persons will be anonymized for the purpose of the study, and he will destroy his tapes as soon as he has completed the relevant publications. Rucola Professor Rucola is a nutritional scientist and proposes to carry out a study measuring salad-eating habits in the general public. She will ask members of the public to ll in a questionnaire on their eating habitsin generalover a period of time and from this material she will gather information on salad consumption. Her consent form will explain that she is carrying out research on eating habits, but will not mention that she is only interested in salad consumption as she is worried that revealing this fact will distort the results, i.e. if people know that 46Athanassoulis and Wilson Clinical Ethics 2009 Volume 4 Number 1 she is measuring salad-eating habits, and given assump- tions about healthy eating and the bene ts of eating salad, her subjects will either change their eating habits or inaccurately report their eating habits for the duration of the trial. Most people (in our admittedly unscienti c sample of research ethics committee members) tend to think that Bamforthis much more ethically problematic than Rucola, and when asked to justify this, tend to explain the difference as being in large part due to the fact that Bamforthinvolves deception, whileRucoladoes not. We agree with the claim thatBamforthis more ethically prob- lematic, but we do not think that deceptiveness has any- thing to do with this, for two reasons. First, as we have just argued, whether withholding information is deceptive or not does notby itselfmake any difference to the moral judgements we ought to make. Second, there are reasons for thinking thatRucolais as deceptive asBamforth: both cases are similar insofar as disclosure of the precise purpose of the study would invalidate the study’s method- ology; as in both cases participants would alter their behaviour if they knew it was being measured during the trial. Moreover, in both cases the researchers deliberately withhold information which is relevant to understanding the purpose of the research, and in so doing intentionally mislead the trial participants as to the purpose of the research. Given a non-normative conception of deception, we think that it is very plausible to say that both studies involve the researcher deceiving the research participants. (The inclination to say thatRucolais not deceptive comes, we think, from an erroneous attachment to a normative account of deception.) However, to say that the researchers are deceptive in both cases is not to say that they act wrongly in both cases: rather, we shall argue that onlyBamforthinvolves wrongfuldeception, as the deception inRucola– like the magician case – is one that a reasonable person would have no reason to object to. InBamforth, the fact that the observer is interested only in interviews that break bad news seems signi cant to the decision whether to participate. Participating in a trial on the breaking of bad news seems signi cantly differ- ent to participating in a trial on doctor – patient communi- cation in general. The reason for this is that the nature of the news being communicated is potentially very sensitive and very distressing. A potential participant who would be willing to participate in a general communication trial, may not be willing to participate in a trial where she is observed while being told very sensitive and very distres- sing news. InRucola, the information that the observer is only interested in salad-eating habits is innocuous in that it would not affect a reasonable participant’s willingness to participate. Participants who decided that the aims of a trial on nutrition are signi cant enough to persuade them to give up their time to record their eating habits would not alter their decision by nding out that this was indeed a study on speci c rather than general eating habits. Salad-eating habits are not contentious in theway that being told bad news is. Therefore, the fact that this is a trial on salad-eating habits is not crucial to making the decision of whether to participate or not. Hence we think that it would be best for an ethics committee to rejectBamforthon the grounds of wrongful deception as it stands, while the deception inRucolais not ethically problematic. It might be objected that in theBamforthcase the deception does not increase the risk of harm inherent in the breaking of bad news, and that hence the fact that the overall context is one in which there is a risk of harm does not show that there is a moral difference in the deception in the two cases. We think this is a mistake. One of the relevant moral differ- ences concerns the potential violation of privacy in Bamforth. Notice that while violations of privacy will very often be harmful, it is plausible to think that vio- lations of privacy can be wrong even where theydo not cause harm. Such actions would fall into the category that Joel Feinberg described as ‘harmless wrongdoing’. 3If this is right, then even if no additional risk of harm occurs as a result of the deception in Bamforth, the researcher’s actions might still be wrongful in virtue of being a breach of privacy. We conclude that the operative moral principle should not be whether or not a given piece of research involves deception, but whether it involves deception that is prima faciewrongful. (To say that deception in a given cir- cumstance is prima facie wrongful is to say that deceiving in this case would be wrong if there were no other moral principles relevant to the situation. Where there are other moral principles such as non-male cence operative, we may sometimes judge that the prima facie wrongfulness of a given piece of deception can be outweighed. Providing an account of how such balancing is to be performed is beyond the scope of this article.) One could object here that there is nothing stopping Bamforthfrom re-describing the aims of the trial to involve general communications issues. This raises two possibilities. It might be the case thatBamforththen inten- tionally misdescribes the aims of the trial in order to obtain ethics approval. However this is clearly unethical asBamforthis then seeking to deceive the ethics commit- tee as to his true purpose. On the other hand, it might be the case thatBamforth’sinitial aims are rather broad, e.g. doctor – patient communications in general, but a narrower theme emerges during the trial, e.g. claims relating to the breaking of bad news. In such a case, as long as researchers are acting in good faith in their original description of the project there is no deception, it’s simply that the aims of the trial have changed during its course. 4 We suggest that ethics committees should take decep- tive withholding of information to beprima faciewrongful only where it deprives a research participant of inform- ation that would be relevant to the decision of a reason- able person as to whether to join the research project. Notice that there may be some people whowouldobject to the withholding of information that a reasonable person would not object to. For instance in theRucola case, there might be someone who had a pathological When is deception in research ethical?47 Clinical Ethics 2009 Volume 4 Number 1 hatred of salad, and who was most unhappy at the prospect of taking part in a piece of research which could form the basis of a campaign to increase salad uptake. While it is important for ethics committees to be representative, and to make sure that they do not make judgements of ‘reasonableness’ which re ect their narrow cultural or class interests, it is impossible for ethics com- mittees to take into account every possible set of values, however unusual, in thinking about information provision. The primary job of an ethics committee is to determine whether a given research project is suitable for researchers to invite participants to take part in it. This is a general task, which by de nition cannot be tailored speci cally to each possible set of values. Hence where the partici- pants recruited are competent adults the participants must bear some responsibility for informing researchers of unusual values they may have that research ethics commit- tees might not have taken into account in thinking about whether the research project is ethically acceptable. Our principle for determining when deceptive with- holding of information is ethically acceptable relies on the idea of reasonableness, and so is in an obvious way indeterminate. In part this is an inescapable feature of principles. However, in the nal section we shall attempt to esh out the principle a bit, by arguing that there is good reason to think that our standards of reasonable revelation of information should be higher in research than elsewhere. Why research as a context creates a strong presumption of revelation The pro le of the risks in research is most unusual, and this has effects on the way we should conceive of reasonable provision of information in research. In short, the nature of research as a context creates a presupposition that more rather than less information will be provided, and hence makes it more dif cult to justify deceptive withhold- ing of information than elsewhere. Hansson and Hermansson 5argue that in any risk man- agement problem there are three parties. First, there are those on whom the risk is imposed; second, there are those who control the risk; and third, there are those who bene t from the risk being run. Their chief thought is that the rst thing we should do in looking at a risk man- agement context is ask whether it is a context in which the same person occupies all three roles, or whether it is a context in which the controller of the risk and the bene- ciary of the risk are different from the person who is sub- jected to the risk. Where one and the same person bene ts from the risk and can control the risk that they are exposing themselves to, then the context of risk is least ethically problematic: a case of this sort would be when an experienced mount- aineer climbs a dif cult mountain. Most ethically prob- lematic are those cases where the risk-exposed neither bene t from their risk exposure nor can control their exposure to the risk: a case of this kind would be wherea company pollutes the local water supply because this is cheaper than disposing of their waste properly, and local residents have no option but to continue drinking the water. Research has two features that push it towards the more ethically problematic end of the risk management spectrum. First, research does not aim speci cally to bene t the par- ticipants: instead the aim is to generate new knowledge. Even in cases of so-called therapeutic research, what makes the interventionresearchas opposed to treatment is the attempt to generate new knowledge, and the speci cally research elements of the treatment do not seek directly to bene t the patient. 6Given that those exposed to the risks of research are not intended to bene t from the risk imposition, this immediately makes the risk context more problematic than the mountain-climber case. Second, the research participant has limited control over his or her risk exposure: the typical research partici- pant is very unlike the experienced mountaineer who can see the rockface above (and has probably climbed the route before), and can at each stage decide which way to ascend in order to ensure safety. The chief ways research participants can control the risks they are exposed to are the informed consent process, and their right of exit from the research project. Given the typical power relations between researchers and researched, ethics committees are usually rightly reluctant to place too much of the needed weight of risk management on the right of exit from research. It follows that a great deal of the problems of risk management in research need to be solved by the informed consent process. Valid consent requires that the participant be given information adequate to making a reasonable decision as to whether to take part in the research or not. Where the information revealed is less than all that is relevant, then the partici- pant does not have adequate control of the risk, and the risks imposed begin to look more like those in the water pollution case than in the mountain-climber case. Given the nature of the risk management problems that the context of research presents, we think that there is a reasonable presumption that all facts, which would be relevant to making the decision to take part in the research project, will be revealed. And therefore, given this reasonable presupposition, the failure to do so will in general be prima facie ethically unacceptable. However, where methodological considerations require deceptive withholding of information from participants, and the information withheld is not relevant to the decision that a reasonable person would make as to whether to partici- pate in the research, deceptive withholding of information is permissible. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Stephen Wilkinson, Anthony Wrigley, Tom Walker, Jonathan Hughes and Angus Dawson for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. Some of James Wilson’s contribution to 48Athanassoulis and Wilson Clinical Ethics 2009 Volume 4 Number 1 this work was undertaken at UCLH/UCL who received a proportion of funding from the Department of Health’s NIHR Biomedical Research Centres funding scheme. References and notes 1 Sokol D. Dissecting ‘deception’.Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics2006;15:457 – 64 2 Unless of course they thought that this was deceptive, and that they were wronged by being deceived. However this would support theclaim that we are trying to get to, namely that Harrydoesdeceive the customer 3 Feinberg J.Harmless Wrongdoing. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990 4 This change may necessitate re-af rming consent to participate, but this issue is outside the scope of this paper 5 Hansson SO, Hermansson H. A three-party model tool for ethical risk analysis.Risk Management2007;9:129 – 44 6 Miller FG, Brody H. A critique of clinical equipoise: therapeutic mis- conception in the ethics of clinical trials.The Hastings Center Report 2003;33:19 – 28 When is deception in research ethical?49 Clinical Ethics 2009 Volume 4 Number 1
Module 5 Assignment 1
Protected Populations in Research Because decades ago, prior to the establishment of IRBs, some researchers took far too many liberties with human populations, IRB rules and regulations have put in place even greater protection for certain human populations. Populations that are deemed vulnerable or protected include minors (anyone under age eighteen), prisoners, people who are mentally challenged, people who are mentally ill, people who are homeless, people who are physically disabled, older adults, pregnant women, and anyone who is cognitively impaired (such as someone with a traumatic brain injury or dementia). Minors include anyone under the age of eighteen years. Someone who is seventeen years and ten months old is considered just as much a minor as someone who is seventeen days old. Generally, most populations other than healthy adults aged between eighteen and fifty-five years are protected. The IRB will review applications involving protected or vulnerable populations even more thoroughly than research that does not involve those groups. Further, the IRB is also cautious in cases of research of a sensitive nature, such as trauma, abuse, or sexual behavior. The purpose of classifying some groups as protected or vulnerable is to acknowledge that some individuals might not be able to understand the informed consent process, including any possible risks associated with the research. For example, a minor cannot actually legally give full consent. He or she can give what is called assent, and his or her parent or legal guardian must give full consent for the minor to participate in research. So research on minors involves consent from both minors and their parents or legal guardians. Similarly, research on individuals with brain injury or dementia might also require additional consent from their legal guardians. Other groups are protected in order to ensure that they are not coerced into participating in research. For example, offering to compensate incarcerated or homeless individuals $100 for participating in a twenty-minute research study would be considered coercive, because these groups are likely to have no other way of earning that amount of money. Essentially, offering them so much money to participate would compel them to agree to be involved in the research (i.e., coercion) rather than having them participate of their own volition. It is acceptable to compensate participants, but any such incentives must not be so high that they are considered coercive, which holds true regardless of whether the group is protected or not. To further explore ethics in forensic research, take a moment to read the following article from the University online library resources: Ethical Issues in Forensic and Correctional Research
Module 5 Assignment 1
Ethical issues in forensic and correctional research Tony Ward ⁎, Gwenda Willis Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand abstract article info Article history: Received 29 March 2010 Received in revised form 8 July 2010 Accepted 8 July 2010 Available online 15 July 2010 Keywords: Forensic and correctional ethics Offenders Research ethics It is surprising that while the literature on ethical issues associated with social science research is burgeoning and becoming increasingly sophisticated very few papers have been written on the ethics of forensic or correctional research. The literature that exists is disappointingly narrow and superficial, and relies on professional ethical codes to a considerable degree. In this paper we present an ethical framework developed by Ward and Syversen to help with ethical decision making in research contexts. We then discuss some of the specific ethical challenges for researchers working in forensic and correctional domains, and consider how best to deal with ethical problems drawing from this framework. Our aim will be to provide researchers with some general ideas of how to proceed in certain situations rather than come up with afinal set of answers to every conceivable problem. © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Contents 1. Introduction…………………………………………………….. 399 2. An ethical framework for research in forensic and correctional domains……………………………. 400 2.1. Addressing ethical conflicts…………………………………………… 401 3. Ethical issues in forensic and correctional contexts…………………………………….. 402 3.1. The design, collection, analysis, and reporting of research data…………………………….. 402 3.1.1. Making theoretical assumptions explicit………………………………….. 402 3.1.2. Research aims…………………………………………….. 402 3.1.3. Selection of research designs………………………………………. 403 3.1.4. Data presentation……………………………………………. 403 3.1.5. Negative results……………………………………………. 404 3.1.6. Analysis decisions and resource wastage………………………………….. 404 3.1.7. Self-as-instrument…………………………………………… 404 3.1.8. Participants and data………………………………………….. 404 3.2. Researchers and offenders: issues and problems…………………………………… 405 3.2.1. Ethical blindness……………………………………………. 405 3.2.2. The moral status of offenders………………………………………. 405 3.2.3. The vulnerability of offenders………………………………………. 406 3.2.4. Cultural differences…………………………………………… 407 3.2.5. Virtues and vices……………………………………………. 407 3.2.6. Assumptions about disorders………………………………………. 408 4. Conclusions…………………………………………………….. 408 References……………………………………………………….. 408 1. Introduction Social science research involves investigation of social phenomena at various levels of abstraction, from social institutions such as marriage or kinship systems to individual persons and the psychological and cultural processes that influence how they act and experience the world. Like any research care is taken to gatherdata in a systematic, explicit, and Aggression and Violent Behavior 15 (2010) 399–409 ⁎Corresponding author. School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand. E-mail address:[email protected](T. Ward). 1359-1789/$–see front matter © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.avb.2010.07.002 Contents lists available atScienceDirect Aggression and Violent Behavior transparent way only endorsing methods that have proved to be useful and jettisoning those that have resulted in unreliable data and faulty conclusions. Social and behavioral science is in short, a self-correcting epistemic engine and is constituted by a combination of general methods, data analytic strategies, and a social network of individuals who are committed to acquiring a deep understanding of human behavior and its cultural and social scaffolding (Sterelny, 2003). The norms that regulate the practice of science function to offset personal biases, human cognitive limitations, and political interference and through a combination of explicit, general rules and critical review have arguably positively transformed the lives of human beings in countless ways. Alongside knowledge generating norms are ethical norms that are intended to ensure that the practice of social science is undertaken in ways that benefit rather than harm research participants, researchers, and the rest of the community. These aims are nicely expressed by Symonette (2009): Social research ethics speaks to the morally responsible ways in which we should conduct ourselves as we design and engage in systematic inquiry, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination pro- cesses via-a-vis individuals, groups, organizations, communities, and so on. Ethical practice is reflected in the extent to which researchers conduct themselves and their research in ways that are respectful, are fairly representative (accurate and just) and ideally leave persons better off or at least minimally,“does no harm”(280–281). Thus, ethics in a research context is broadly concerned with undertaking investigatory activities in ways that respect each person’s moral equality and associated entitlements (Driver, 2006). The above quote directly raises an important ethical issue concerning the competences that can be reasonably expected of a researcher and the degree to which norms ought be rationally justified rather than arbitrarily asserted (Kitchener, 2000). This general issue can be unpacked in the form of two fundamental ethical questions that social science researchers are obligated to respond to (Ginsberg & Mertens, 2009; Kitchener & Kitchener, 2009). First, how should research data be collected, analysed and reported? This question speaks to issues such as the design of a research project, its scientific merits, the way the data is presented in reports, in what forum reports are presented, keeping data private, and the status of the participants in the research process. Second, how should researchers act towards participants in their research projects? This question covers topics such as informed consent, conflict of interests, possible benefits or harms that might be experienced by the participants, legitimacy of deception, existence of coercion, cultural differences, and the ethical status of participants. It is surprising that while the literature on ethical issues associated with social science research is burgeoning and becoming increasingly sophisticated very few papers have been written on the ethics of forensic or correctional research (but seeAdshead & Brown, 2003; Overholser, 1987). The literature that does exist is disappointingly narrow and superficial, and relies on professional ethical codes to a considerable degree. However,Lavin (2004)asserts that professional ethical codes are insufficient to guide forensic and correctional research or practice and recommends that researchers acquaint themselves with ethical theory and concepts to enrich their ethical perception and decision making. Furthermore, Lavin states that ethical codes are opaque in their wording, contain inclusions, and exclusions that do little“moral work”and“invite psychologists to forget to look long and hard at controversial areas of practice”(p. 51). Indeed,Ward and Syversen (2009) argued in their recent paper that ethical codes are comprised of sets of rules designed to address issues within a specific domain of practice and ethical conflicts can emerge when ethical rules from different domains clash. For example, the rules of a correctional agency that is preoccupied with risk containment (e.g., prison) may clash with a professional’s ethical code of ethics (welfare concerns of prisoners). Higher level ethicalconcepts such as dignity or human rights provide theoretical resources that can be used to resolve such conflicts. Articles that do focus directly on forensic and correctional ethical concerns concen- trate on procedural matters and almost invariably are preoccupied with practice related issues such as who is the client, safety, dual relationships, how to deal with duty to warn situations, and so on (Bush, Connell, & Denny, 2006; Haag, 2006). More research oriented work tends to concentrate on matters of recruitment and barriers to research rather than systemically addressing the ethical questions confronting all social science researchers outlined above (Appelbaum, 2008). We certainly do not want to undervalue the relevance or importance of issues like participant recruitment or confidentiality but simply raise questions about the depth and comprehensiveness of current scholarly debate on correctional and forensic research ethics. In our view, because there has been no attempt that we are aware of to respond to the major ethical concerns raised by researchers in a broader social science context such asKitchener (2000), Kitchener and Kitchener (2009) or Ginsberg and Mertens (2009), researchers in the forensic and correctional domain lack a conceptual framework to help them to detect and resolve pressing ethical problems. There is a real danger that such researchers are simply unaware of difficulties that do exist and therefore run the risk of failing to act when they should do, or alternatively, dealing with problems that are noted in ethically inappropriate ways (Ward & Syversen, 2009). In this paper we apply an ethical framework developed byWard and Syversen (2009; based on earlier work byCooper, 2004 and Kitchener, 2000) to help with ethical decision making in research contexts. We then discuss some of the specific ethical challenges for researchers working in forensic and correctional domains, using the two questions outlined above as a guide. We consider how best to deal with ethical problems that arise in forensic and correctional contexts drawing from this framework. The two questions are intended to be a heuristic guide only and we appreciate that there is a degree of overlap between them and also the identified ethical problems and our responses. Our aim will be to provide researchers with somegeneral ideasof how to proceed in certain situations rather than come with afinal set of answers to every conceivable problem. We will spend relatively little time discussing practical matters such as how to balance the risks and benefits of research or how to concretely ensure participant safety. In our view exact solutions are not possible because of the open ended nature of real world ethical concerns (Driver, 2006) and also because in some situations ethical principles conflict and there may be a number of ethically justifiable courses of action available to a person. While the possibility of ethical conflicts is unsettling to some, similar puzzles arise in the factual side of scientific practice; sometimes there are different but equally justifiable ways to explain phenomena. Presence of epistemic and ethical uncertainly on occasions is simply a legacy of our less than perfect cognitive and emotional equipment and also a reflection of the complexity of the world and its inhabitants. This paper differs from the earlier Ward and Syversen one in that it seeks to apply aspects of the framework developed in that paper to ethical issues in forensic and correctional research, and furthermore, assumes the validity of that ethical model. The ethical concerns that are the focus of this paper are ones that appear to us to be important, based on our reading of the literature on research ethics in allied areas and partly derived from our own research experience and reflection. Our hope is that the paper will provide an impetus for further theoretical and empirical work in a neglected area of research ethics. 2. An ethical framework for research in forensic and correctional domains In a recent paper,Ward and Syversen (2009)developed an integrated ethical framework that covered the different levels of ethical tasks inherent in forensic and correctional work. In our view, this framework provides a helpful way of addressing the various ethical 400T. Ward, G. Willis / Aggression and Violent Behavior 15 (2010) 399–409 issues evident in forensic and correctional research. We will briefly describe this model before putting it to work in the next section to provide guidance dealing with the problems discussed earlier. The key argument of theWard and Syversen (2009)paper is that researchers and practitioners ought to justify their ethical decisions in a stepwise process, typicallyfirst relying on their commonsense everyday reasoning and then in successive steps appealing to the standards of ethical codes, principles underling ethical codes (e.g., beneficence, autonomy, justice, and integrity), ethical concepts and theory and ultimately, the concept of human dignity. According to Ward and Syversen, when faced with justifying specific ethical judgments and subsequent actions professionalsfirst fall back to their relevant code of ethics. Typically, ethical codes are comprised of a series of foundational principles based on core values and a set of explicit standards or rules that reflect these core values (Bush et al., 2006; Koocher & Keith-Spiegel, 2009; O’Donohue & Ferguson, 2003). Forensic researchers and practi- tioners are introduced to basic ethical concepts during their training and are expected to continue to develop ethical expertise during the course of their careers. A problem relying simply on professional codes to deal with ethical dilemmas is that they may conflict with alternative ethical codes such as those overseeing the actions of correctional workers or other agencies. A second problem is that codes only cover customary practice and there may be situations they do not cover. Finally, there remains the thorny issue of how to justify the standards of ethical codes when challenged. According to theWard and Syversen (2009)model, when faced with a demand to justify the standards regulating their professional actions the next step is to appeal to the major ethical principles such as justice, beneficence (caring), autonomy, or integrity. A useful way to regard the abstract principles is as core values that can be appealed upon to justify and explain specific ethical judgments and actions (seeCooper, 2004). Otherwise, there is a danger that practitioners will be simply left with a set of rules that: (a) can appear arbitrary if not underpinned by more abstract normative principles or theories, (b) may have limited scope in some situations and without principles to fall back on practitioners may be left without adequate normative guidance, and (c) have few resources for development since sets of ethical standards on their own are essentially closed conceptual systems. When further pressed to justify these abstract principles, researchers may appeal to ethical theories or belief systems such as utilitarianism or virtue ethics (Driver, 2006). It is possible to shift to an even higher level of abstraction at the metaethical level where the status and meaning of terms such as“goodness”or“right”are analysed (Cooper, 2004; Kitchener & Kitchener, 2009).Ward and Syversen (2009)propose that the concept of human dignity provides a way of sidestepping arguments over the type of ethical theory that should underpin practice. The choice of“human dignity”is based on a convergent consensus that this term can supply the conceptual foundation for debates about universal justice, peace, and freedom initiatives around the world, as evidenced in the variety of human rights protocols currently accepted (Churchill, 2006; Li, 2006; Nussbaum, 2006; United Nations, 1948). In other words, the concept of human dignity and its associated ideas is acknowledged as foundational by many individuals whose specific moral theories and codes diverge and therefore it is ideally placed to function as an integrative concept for ethical reasoning in the forensic and correctional domains. Thus, ultimately the concept of human dignity underpins researchers’ and practitioners’ specific decisions, ethical codes, principles, and theories and also suggests ways to deal with the variety of complex ethical issues evident in both research and practice. In essence, the concept of dignity designates the moralworthor value of all human beings (Sulmasy, 2007). Because of their inherent dignity human beings are assumed to possess equal moral status and therefore are expected to receive equal consideration in matters that directly affect their core interests. According to the analysis byBeyleveld andBrownsword (2001), the dignity of human beings is located in their capacity to formulate and pursue their interests in the world (empowerment) without unjustified interference by other people. In order to actively pursue their core interests and goals, individuals require a certain level of well-being and access to social, psychological, and material resources, otherwise it would be impossible for them to function as autonomous individuals (i.e., dependence on resources and opportunities are constraints, their absence undermines a person’s agency efforts). However, individuals’ own judgments are not the only determinants of what constitutes a dignified life and sometime people can act in ways that are freely chosen that unfortunately diminish their status as human beings. An example in the correctional domain might be where offenders agree to harsh and humiliating interventions because they do not believe they are worthy of better treatment. A notable implication of a concept of dignity based on empowerment and constraint is that it points to the vulnerabilities of human beings because of their nature as embodied, social animals. In order to be able to act in pursuit of personally selected goals and their translation into plans of action, basic needs have to be meet as well and educational opportunities and social scaffolding provided. In other words, human beings require certain primary goods and opportunities to be able to act in ways worthy of their intrinsic value (Ward & Maruna, 2007). Because of their critical role both in helping people lead a life of dignity and ensuring they have the necessary capabilities to function according to their inherent dignified nature, these resources are viewed asentitle- mentsand therefore are protected by fundamental moral and legal rights. It is important to emphasize that because respect for all individuals ultimately stems from their inherent dignity it cannot be ethically justifiably be taken from them through the actions of the state or by other people. 2.1. Addressing ethical conflicts A difficult question concerns exactly how researchers should reason about the range of ethical dilemmas that confront them in correctional and forensic research. The nature of such conflicts and their complexity means that more often than not it is a question of engaging in an ethical balancing process. If so, exactly how should the process of ethical reasoning based upon the concept of human dignity unfold in research contexts? It is clearly not possible to resolve this issue in a paper intended to provide an overview of both underap- preciated and noted ethical concerns in research but there are some important conceptual constraints that ought to regulate any such attempts. According toBecker (1986)all moral practice is under- pinned by two core justificatory assumptions, those ofgeneralizability and equality. Thus, when faced with the inevitable dilemmas generated by research, any solutions should: (a) generalize to other persons in similar situations, and (b) treat every person involved as someone of equal moral status (i.e., as possessing inherent dignity). The latter constraint means that unless there are good reasons it is presumed that the interests of all individuals will be equally considered and any decision should result in outcomes that are judged as fair. The two constraints of generalizability and equality will rule out some strategies for addressing research ethical problems. For example, mandated treatment (and associated research projects) would be ruled out for psychologically competent offenders because it overrides the equality assumption without adequate justification. Furthermore, it arguably also violates the assumption of generaliz- ability as it is unlikely researchers would permit themselves or non- offenders to be forcibly treated. Similarly, the biased presentation of data would be ruled out because it could result in wasted research resources, which denies the opportunity for policy makers and the community to make balanced decisions about the allocation of funds. This failure ignores the equality of individuals as co-decision makers, and if universalized, could undermine research completely. Finally, when recruiting participants for a project neglecting relevant 401 T. Ward, G. Willis / Aggression and Violent Behavior 15 (2010) 399–409 individual differences such as ethnicity or overlooking the vulnera- bility of offenders to implicit or explicit coercion does not succeed in meeting the requirements of both tests. It fails the generalizability assumption because most individuals would reject a general rule that allowed researchers to exploit vulnerable individuals for research purposes. Furthermore, the fact that the participants were not provided with (a) relevant information or were (b) pressured to consent would also fail to meet the equality assumption. In summary, we propose that researchers approach ethical issues with the above framework in mind. This multilevel framework ought to be able to help them detect ethical problems that are typically missed,find creative solutions to those that are identified, and provide deeper and less question begging justifications for decisions. We will address some of the pressing ethical issues associated with forensic and correctional research and demonstrate how this framework can help to shed some light on these concerns. 3. Ethical issues in forensic and correctional contexts 3.1. The design, collection, analysis, and reporting of research data Ethical problems in this section all revolve around the design of studies and the ways in which data are collected, analysed, and presented in journals or reports. The various issues cluster into the following themes: (a) making theoretical assumptions explicit, (b) aims of research, (c) selection of research designs, (d) data presentation, (e) negative data, (f) analysis decisions and resource wastage, (g) self as an instrument, andfinally (h) participants and data. 3.1.1. Making theoretical assumptions explicit Afirst problem involves the importance of ensuring that a researcher’s theoretical assumptions are made explicit rather than remaining implicit (Brown & Hedges, 2009). Articulation of a research problem often will involve clarifying the nature of a phenomenon such as deviant sexual arousal in sex offenders or speculating about the causal mechanisms that generate a phenomenon, for example, deviant sexual preferences (Ward, Polaschek, & Beech, 2006). Once researchers are clear about their assumptions it is then a question of ascertaining what kind of design will provide the data necessary to clarify or address the problem at issue. The danger is that failure to clearly specify the postulated relevant mechanisms may result in poorly directed investigation or else premature acceptance of current ideas and practice. Misdirected research might occur due to a lack of sustained analysis and a reliance on theoretical concepts that contain contradictory elements or are overly vague. In addition to wasting researcher and participant resources, unfounded or vague specula- tions about the offender group in question may harden into received dogma and derail future investigatory efforts and also lead to poorly conceived policies. An example of unfounded assumptions is the imposition of geographical residency restrictions on sex offenders which seems to be based on mistaken assumptions about sex offenders offense related actions, namely that they will prey on the geographically closest victim. In fact, evidence indicates that geo- graphical proximity on its own is not a reliable indicator of sexual offending and therefore the resources tied up in environmental restrictions are misdirected (Duwe, Donnay, & Tewksbury, 2008; Zandbergen, Levenson, & Hart, 2010). Another example is the sex offendingfield’s earlier view that offenders only follow one offense and/or relapse process, whereas, theoretical analysis and later empirical evidence revealed that there are in fact a number of distinct offense trajectories (Hudson, Ward, & McCormack, 1999; Ward, Yates, & Long, 2006; Yates & Kingston, 2006). Making theoretical assumptions explicit will also avoid the danger of premature negative stereotyping where assumptions are made about the attributes of a group of offenders, for example violent males, that are unjustified (Major & O’Brien, 2005). According to the Duluth model maleviolence against woman is the result of gender based injustices and inherent sexism (Langlands, Ward, & Gilchrist, 2009). Failure to critically examine this assumption has resulted in poorly directed research, the establishment of treatment programs that do not seem to be particularly effective (Smedslund, Dalsbø, Steiro, Winsvold, & Clench-Aas, 2007), and may also cause offenders to construe themselves in ways that are untrue and potentially damaging (Langlands et al., 2009). Another example is the tendency to view child sex offenders as predators whose deviant inclinations means they are consistently at risk for harming children if insufficiently scrutinised and controlled. Whereas, in reality the evidence suggests that for many sex offenders offending is contextually dependent and also that social inclusion rather than exclusion is more likely to lead to reduced offending (Laws & Ward, in press). While we appreciate that not all forensic and correctional research sets out totest theory,itiscommonlyacceptedinthe philosophy and sociology of science that both descriptive and theory testing research activities are underpinned by supporting theoretical and methodological assumptions (Balashov & Rosenberg, 2002). One of the virtues of making such assumptions explicit is that their limitations and validity can be more easily evaluated thus helping to avoid poorly thought out projects. The concept of human dignity points to the obligation of all researchers to consider the interests of all individuals affected by research when planning and carrying out studies. Failure to do this may mean that offenders are characterized in terms that are stigmatizing as well as inaccurate. The justificatory assumptions of universality and equality, in conjunction with the concept of dignity, outlined above should minimize the chances of this happening. 3.1.2. Research aims A second point concerns the broader social aims of research in ethical and forensic contexts irrespective of whether its focus is on etiological or assessment and program related matters. The design of a study and methods of data collection depend on the reasons for undertaking it and also arguably who is likely to benefitfromthefindings. For example, if the members of the public have a strong interest in ensuring that sexual violence towards women and children is reduced then research priorities in the area of sexual violence are likely to reflect this concern. A difficulty may be that research into other, equally important, correctional and forensic issues is neglected or that there is pressure to develop programs without the basic science being in place. Thus, in order to acquire funding researchers may prematurely accept clinically derived theory and treatment programs based on this theory as warranted knowledge and proceed to design program evaluation studies. An example of this is arguably the premature acceptance of suggestions that there is a causal relationship between sexual offending and negative affect whereas the actual research evidence for this relationship is comparatively meagre (McCoy & Fremouw, 2010). Alternatively, as stated above, the treatment of men who are violent towards their partners is based on very little research evidence and surprisingly weak theory (Langlands, Ward, & Gilchrist, 2009). It would not be hard tofind examples in other areas of forensic and correctional psychology. The key point is that researchers ought to critically reflect on the reasons why they want to proceed with a study and whether there is sufficient justification to do so. The adverse ethical implications of proceeding with research projects based on insufficient grounds is that: (a) it could mislead people, (b) it confers inappropriate authority on a program or researchfindings, and (c) it may divert precious resources from possibly more valuable projects. The politics of research funding can sometimes distort researchers’ judgments and there is a risk that wasted research efforts may damage the chances of further research funding and ultimately the reduction of reoffending rates and human misery. The justificatory assumptions of universality and equality should encourage researchers to think systematically about the benefits and burdens of research from the perspectives of all stakeholders and hopefully lead them to carefully balance any competing interests. 402T. Ward, G. Willis / Aggression and Violent Behavior 15 (2010) 399–409 Another strand to the question of the underlying aims that motivate research in forensic and correctional context is the matter of whose interestsare taken into account in the inquiry process. According to the ethical framework described above, all human beings have core interests (and associated dignity) and are entitled to have these interests taken into consideration in social policies initiatives that are likely to affect them. For example, communitarian and restorative justice approaches to punishment and reintegration depend on the participation of offenders, victims, and members of the community for effective outcomes (Miller, 2003; Ward & Langlands, 2009). Furthermore, research into the impact of restorative punish- ment and reintegration practices likewise assumes that all individuals are committed to a common set of aims and that their particular viewpoints have been canvassed and taken into account. If this is not the case and the needs of victims, offenders or members of the public have been unreasonably neglected, then the integrity of the research has been threatened, both ethically and empirically. The ethical issue raised here speaks to a need to be inclusive when undertaking forensic and correctional research and not to simply justify research on the basis of the assumed benefits for one group of individuals. From an ethical perspective, all individuals (universal justificatory assump- tion) affected by a project merit equal consideration (equality justificatory assumption) and the various risks and benefits balanced when undertaking applied research (Ward & Langlands, 2009). 3.1.3. Selection of research designs A third ethical problem relates to decisions concerning the kind of research designs and analytical methods employed in a project. The choice between the use of ethnographic, interview based, or experi- mental research designs is a crucial one and has ethical dimensions alongside epistemic considerations such as the degree to which causal inferences are facilitated or natural social processes respected. A useful example of how disagreement over design issues can erupt into ethical debates is the recent interchange betweenMarshall and Marshall (2007, 2008) and Seto et al. (2007)over whether or not the random controlled trial (RCT) is the gold standard for research into the effectiveness of sexual offending treatment. Marshall and Marshall argued that RCT designs lack ecological validity and also raised serious ethical concerns about allocating offenders to nontreatment conditions, thereby possibly placing future members of the community at risk from untreated men. In their view, RCT are not necessary for treatment evaluation research in the sexual offending arena and they suggested that alternative research designs such as incidental designs or actuarially based evaluations may be better options. Seto et al. took issue with Marshall and Marshall’s contentions and argued strongly for the value of RCT designs (suitably implemented) in providing robust evidence for treatment effectiveness. They commented that proceeding with treatments when there is insufficient evidence for their utility is unethical and also that there may be further unintended (ethical and psychological) consequences that have not been detected, for example, embellishing deviant sexual fantasies in individuals following their exposure to the fantasies of others in groups. The issue we would like to highlight is that there are good ethical arguments on either side of the RCT debate and that the choice of a research design ought not to rely simply on scientific grounds. In our view, ethical reasons should take priority over empirical or scientific ones and research that violates important ethical assumptions (e.g., acceptably diminishes dignity and violates the assumptions of univer- sality and equality) and constraints ought not to proceed.Mark and Gamble (2009)assert that despite constituting an extremely powerful research design sometimes RCT designs may not be desirable if reasonable evidence already exists that certain treatment approaches are likely to be useful. They state that for a RCT design to be implemented “there needs to be real uncertainty about the best course of action, that is, about which alternative is preferable”(p. 204). There is certainly a question mark over whether this degree of uncertainty exists when itcomes to the treatment of sex offenders with cognitive behavioral techniques (CBT). The impressivefindings from research on offender programs that target criminogenic needs (dynamic risk factors) and follow the principles of risk and responsivity are likely to reduce reoffending rates is certainly relevant here (Andrews & Bonta, 2003; Hanson,Bourgon,Helmus,&Hodgson,2009). In short, evidence from this research is that sex offender CBT oriented programs that follow these principles are likely to result in reduced reoffending rates. If a CBT treatment progam for sex offenders follows the principles of risk, need, and responsivity it is possible that a quasi-experimental design of some kind is scientifically acceptable, and ethically supported. In fact, it is reasonable to conclude that weight of the ethical reasons could favor such designs in view of their practicality and avoidance of the ethical problems associated with RCT designs with a sex offender population. In this example, the treatment needs of sex offenders as well the interests of research funders (resource considerations) and the public (safety) are all considered. The reasons for doing so include considerations of equality and universality, themselves designed to reflect the common dignity of every person. A problem that is especially relevant for researchers using interview based methods and qualitative designs is the danger of creating inappropriately intense and close relationships with participants which ultimately may prove harmful to the offender and also compromise the integrity of the research itself (see section below on dual relationships). Interview based approaches frequently require researchers to establish strong rapport with offenders and there is a danger in prison environments characterized by mistrust, loneliness, and fear that such a relationship could cross the boundaries into a therapeutic one. A potential consequence of this boundary violation is that the interactions will lead to inevitable disappointment and possibly a sense of betrayal in the offenders concerned. By way of contrast, this type of problem is less likely to occur in research using experimental and quasi-experimental designs because of the relationship between researcher and participant is more formal and socially distant. Understanding that offenders are in a vulnerable situation and treating them with sensitivity, respect, and care should help researchers navigate their way around these potential difficulties. In essence, researchers ought to ask themselves how would they feel in such a situation (universality assumption) and what common needs and interests of offenders should be taken into account when implementing this type of research (equality assumption). In addition, it is necessary to articulate the extent and limits of the researcher’s role and care taken to make sure the relationship does not ease into a therapeutic one. An ethic based on human dignity and its related justificatory assumptions of universality and equality, rather than a simple cost–benefit utilitarian approach, should assist researchers to ensure that offenders core interests are never traded off simply for the benefitofothers. 3.1.4. Data presentation A fourth ethical issue related to design, data collection, and analysis concerns the way data are presented. Researchers should be careful to take into account acceptedfindings that are relevant for their research questions and ensure that the data are analysed in ways that reflects these distinctions, and presented accordingly. For example, research on sex offenders that fails to distinguish between risk levels and variables that are known to effect outcomes such as age, sexual deviancy, emotional regulation and so on is misleading and ethically unacceptable (Craig, Beech, & Harkins, 2009). It may result in clinical and research decisions that unfairly disadvantage offenders such as unnecessarily long parole periods or intrusive parole conditions. This problem is particularly pertinent to research on risk assessment. An associated issue is the need to examine results closely and to not rely on simple group effects.Bersoff et al. (2003)emphasize the importance of acknowledging limitations of empirically derived predictions in practice given their use in decisions such as handing down sentences of preventive detention. They highlight that 403 T. Ward, G. Willis / Aggression and Violent Behavior 15 (2010) 399–409 dichotomous judgments are unethical but that class based judgments (provided limitations of such judgments are acknowledged) are ethical—i.e., reporting that a group to which an individual is alleged to belong has a specified risk of reoffending. Thus, in communicating researchfindings, especially on predicting risk of violence/reoffend- ing, it is crucial that characteristics of the research sample are accurately reported. Omitting details of sample characteristics could lead to risk assessment instruments being used with individuals for which the instrument has not been validated. Similarly,Vess (2008) highlights the profound impact risk assessment outcomes can have on (denying) the human rights of sex offenders, and moreover the limitations of current instruments in accurately predicting recidivism. These in effect, constitute violations of the justificatory assumptions of equality and universality. Accordingly, he advocates for careful communication of risk assessment research data, especially acknowl- edgement of the limitations of interpreting risk assessmentfindings with respect to individual offenders. Finally,Douglas and Skeem (2005)state that although advancements have been made in the assessment of violence risk, current structured risk assessments do not often allow for change over time or across contexts. They provide several recommendations for future research in the risk assessment field, including detection of change in risk factors over time, stable and time-specific components of risk factors, and mediators/moderators of risk factors. In light of the above debate, it is prudent for researchers when using risk bands for research purposes or conducting research on risk to take great care to communicate the extent and limitations of theirfindings. The implications of the results and the way they are expressed should be considered from the viewpoints of all the relevant stakeholders, not simply those of the researchers, the public, and the relevant funding bodies. 3.1.5. Negative results Afifth, associated issue, concerns the failure to publish negative studyfindings whether they arise from assessment, etiological, or program evaluation research projects. This matter is as much the responsibility of journal editors and reviewers as individual research- ers. For example, it is a well established recommendation that real efforts should be made to include both published and unpublished studies in meta-analysis in order to avoid thefile drawerproblem, where studies with negative effects are not published (Crombie & Davis, 2009). A difficulty in neglecting to make negativefindings public is that erroneous conclusions about a measure or intervention program’s effectiveness may unduly influence subsequent funding decisions and possibly disadvantage offenders and community members. It goes without saying that such a situation could result in withdrawal of good programs or the continuation of weak ones. 3.1.6. Analysis decisions and resource wastage A sixth problem emerging from data analysis and study design matters occurs when researchers embark on a large study without undergoing power analyses or fail to have explicit rules about what to do if an intervention is clearly effective or ineffective (Mark & Gamble, 2009). In some types of program evaluation research it may be evident early on that a treatment is working and likely to help offenders enhance their quality of life and also reduce risk to the community. It could be argued that in these situations it is ethically and scientifically advantageous to terminate the study prematurely and introduce the program more generally (Morris, 2007). However, terminating a study early could result in some kind of penalty imposed by funding agencies thereby creating an ethical dilemma for forensic and correctional researchers. The ethical issue at stake here concerns the obligation to think about the interests of all those (i.e., universal) affected by the research and to value all interests equally (i.e., equality). Another diffi culty could occur when a study’s inability to demonstrate a significant effect size is due to insufficient numbers, essentially amounting to a waste of resources. Alternatively, a studycould have produced a large effect size with far fewer participants. A lack of clear policy around when to stop effective or ineffective studies again speaks to a waste of resources and poorly thought through ethical procedures and norms. These are ethical issues because unnecessary interventions may cause participants harm, either in terms of their direct effects or the opportunity costs that arise because they were unable to engage in other, possibly more fruitful, activities. 3.1.7. Self-as-instrument A seventh ethical issue arises from ethnographic and qualitative research traditions where the researcher’s self is viewed as an instrument and therefore subject to concerns about reliability, sensitiv- ity, and validity (Symonette, 2009). Problems of bias, lack of reliability and validity arise when researchers’ perceptions of participants play an important role in data gathering and interpretation. The source of bias and subsequent contamination of data analysis is most likely to originate in the theoretical allegiances and methodological commitments of researchers, and ultimately, their core values (Day & Ward, 2010). Values reflect fundamental commitments concerning what is worth- while and best in life and as such underlie choices about how to behave. In this way, it is suggested that values are evident in the broad life goals individuals set for themselves and others and in the way in which these goals are pursued. The danger is that lack of critical scrutiny of theoretical and value assumptions may undermine the integrity of inquiry and result in data and subsequent publications that reflect aspects of researchers’ personal worlds and communities rather than accurately describe the phenomena in question. There is ample research evidence that conceptions of the self may vary within and between cultures and that this fact can influence policy and social behavior, and ultimately certain kinds of research (Li, 2006; Ntseane, 2009; Parekh, 2006). For example, collectivist views of the self necessarily appeal to the role of social groups and their norms in shaping and selecting individuals’ behavior, and thus rely on external social influences to guide a researcher’s actions. An illustration of aspects of a researcher self derived from a collectivist culture would be dispositions to base knowledge claims on social consensus rather than simply individuals’ judgments. Thinking clearly about the viewpoints of all participants rests on the ethical assumptions of equality and universality, and factoring in how common needs are expressed in different cultural and social contexts. There is clearly overlap between conceptions of self as an instrument and researcher vices and virtues that we will discuss later in the section on the researchers relationships to their participants. Putting the question of the nature of the self to one side, there are also question marks about individuals’ abilities to adequately reflect on their own responses and mental states when involved in research activities. This is a knowledge related concern and is based on evidence from cognitive science that much of individuals’ cognitive processing occurs below the threshold of awareness (Clark, 2008). If this evidence is accepted then to expect researchers to be able to reflect critically on their values and thinking processes could be ethically unjustified because it is beyond their capacity. Furthermore, reflection and the values that guide it (e.g., accuracy, fairness, concern of truth, etc.) are themselves ethically laden and can be construed as virtues, an ethically saturated term (Driver, 2006). The implication of the ethical nature of such abilities is that there always are question marks over whether they are worthy of cultivation and also whose interests they serve. In forensic contexts there is real danger that unexamined assumptions about the nature of human goods, punishment, and individual responsibilities could distort attempts to interview and otherwise engage with offenders (Ward & Salmon, 2009). 3.1.8. Participants and data Afinal ethical concern associated with research design, data collection, and presentation revolves around the role of participants in gathering the data and to what degree they should be regarded as co- owners of the information, and potentially, co-authors of subsequent 404T. Ward, G. Willis / Aggression and Violent Behavior 15 (2010) 399–409 research publications. For both ethical and methodological reasons it could be argued that because research participants consent to become involved in a project they have a claim on the data yielded and therefore some entitlement to co-ownership (Ntseane, 2009). This conclusion is partly a function of regarding participants as equal moral agents and also recognition of the fact that agreement (effort) related to a research project confers an entitlement to a full report on its outcomes, and possibly a say in how the data are used—based on equality and universality considerations. And if the data are seen as partly owned by the participants it follows that the publication of the results ought to appear in forms that they are likely to read and understand, and not be simply appear in specialized academic journals. Indigenous offenders may have a particularly strong claim for co-ownership and control, especially when the research touches upon their cultural beliefs and practices (LaFrance & Bull, 2009). In forensic and correctional contexts this ethical concern is pressing because of the power imbalances that exist and reluctance to consider offenders as moral equals and potential research partners (Ward & Salmon, 2009). From a dignity perspective, it is easier to appreciate the force of participant claims to data ownership and to negotiate the tricky issues more adroitly. For example, it seems perfectly acceptable that participants who have contributed significant- ly to a project can reasonably expect a full report on thefindings. Furthermore, if their involvement is considerable, as it inevitably is in some types of ethnographic or interview based research, claims for access to data and some say on where and how they are reported have, at least, prima facie validity. 3.2. Researchers and offenders: issues and problems The ethical problems that arise from research design, data analysis, collection, and presentation also have echoes when it comes to considering researchers direct interactions with offenders on research projects. Furthermore, relevance and importance of the justificatory assumptions of universality and equality (and dignity) outlined earlier, should also modulate researchers’ decisions and subsequent actions. However, the key issues associated with this category spring directly from the face to face nature of researcher-participant relationships and essentially revolve around the themes of (a) ethical blindness, (b) offenders’ moral status, (c) offenders’ vulnerability, (d) cultural/social differences, (e) researcher vices and virtues, and (f) assumptions about disorders and offender treatability (Howells & Day, 2007). 3.2.1. Ethical blindness Afirst ethical concern evident in research and practice domains is that ofethical blindness(Ward & Syversen, 2009). What we mean by this term is that important ethical matters can remain undetected, in part because of the conceptual constraints imposed by the ethical resources relied on by researchers such as professional ethical codes. In our experience, a problem with ethical codes is that because of their derivation from routine research and clinical experience they often do not have anything meaningful to say about some matters that can be legitimately viewed as ethical ones, that is, concerns that are outside the normal moral experience of practitioners and researchers. That is, ethical codes are intended to guide therapists (primarily) in their work with client groups and are developed upon the basis of common problems and issues experienced by them in practice. They are backwardrather thanforward lookingand do not contain the theoretical resources to orientate clinicians to detect ethicalflash- points that have not yet beenflagged in such encounters (Cooper, 2004; Ward & Syversen, 2009). A good example of this unease is the allocation of offenders into treatment bands according to their assessed level of risk, often defended by reference to the Risk-Need- Responsivity model of offender rehabilitation (RNR;Andrews & Bonta, 2003). The problem with restricting research and treatment in these ways is that offenders can be denied legitimate access to treatment, access that they are ethically entitled to receive accordingto human rights declarations, and more fundamentally, their moral equality. In some instances, lower risk offenders in prison or on community orders might have their ability to function effectively seriously compromised by their problems and therefore urgently require help to address the causes of these diffi culties (Ward & Maruna, 2007). The worry is that the problems they do experience could impair their agency and, therefore, result in lowered levels of living and hence constitute significant threats to their dignity (as evidenced in adverse life circumstances). The key point we would like to stress is that problems such as these are not really apparent in forensic ethical writings; they are essentially invisible. Forensic researchers and practitioners often simply assume that the allocation of psychological and social resources is best based on risk level and most sensibly directed at the causes of offending. This is arguably because the normative ethical theory that implicitly or explicitly directs their research is a variant of utilitarianism, which stipulates that the ethically right action in a situation is one that results in the overall greatest amount of happiness or well-being (Driver, 2006). An acknowledged difficulty with utilitarian thinking is that in some circumstances it may lead to individuals legitimate interests being disregarded because to do so will lead to an overall greater utility (i.e., better overall outcomes). While we would not argue with the need to address the causes of offending and to ensure that high risk offenders receive adequate amounts of treatment and associated research, this does not void the legitimate claims of lower risk offenders. It seems that potential and actual ethical problems like the ones raised above are ignored because they are notflagged by the codes that apply to offenders. Failure to fund or allow research into the problems of lower risk individuals is arguably an example of where the core interests (and dignity of a minority-offenders) is disregarded for the sake of the interests of the rest of the community. In our view, this is a serious ethical problem and one that should be directly confronted and not remain undetected and neglected because of ethical blindness. 3.2.2. The moral status of offenders Secondly, the above issue of moral blindness places the question of offenders’ moral status directly into the lime light: do offenders possess the inherent dignity and hence value of the other members of the community (i.e., equality and universality concerns)? If so, does the fact they have received punishment erode their moral status? This is a thorny issue but to cut a complex and long story short we answer these questions in the following way: yes and no (for a detailed discussion of punishment and offender rehabilitation seeWard & Salmon, 2009). Offenders possess the inherent dignity of all members of the community because they are fellow human beings. This dignity is acknowledged and protected by human rights treaties and protocols and applies to offenders and non-offenders alike (Ward & Birgden, 2007). Second, because of offenders’ inherent dignity punishment is arguably only ethically justifiable if it is administered in a way that is respectful, proportionate, and allows for the prospects of repentance and reconciliation (Duff, 2001). In effect, this means that research with offenders should proceed in accordance with their equal moral status. The harsh conditions of imprisonment and neglect of offenders’ welfare apparent in many correctional jurisdictions throughout the western world implies a lack of acknowledgement of this inherent dignity (Lazarus, 2004; Travis, 2005). Poor living conditions, harsh punishment, lack of adequate medical care, isolation from other offenders, lack of sufficient contact with family members, minimal opportunity to acquire useful employment skills, a hostile and unforgiving community all imply a fundamental lack of recognition of offenders’ basic human rights and inherent dignity (Lazarus, 2004; Lippke, 2002; Ward & Birgden, 2007). A lack of dignity recognition creates problems for researchers as such conditions render subsequent research with vulnerable individuals problematic (see below). 405 T. Ward, G. Willis / Aggression and Violent Behavior 15 (2010) 399–409 The matter of informed consent with prisoners does raise the question as to whether it is ever appropriate to use prisoners as research participants.Perez and Treadwell (2009)cite recent research showing that biomedical researchers in the US having difficulty recruiting volunteers for clinical trials (e.g.,Hoffman, 2000) are pushing for access to prisoners as participants in clinical trials (this was common practice as late as 1969, but not currently). The authors discuss ethical issues surrounding prisoners as participants in clinical trials, and argue that“until the question of adequate health care for prisoners is resolved, human experimentation should not be allowed” (p. 201). They go on to assert that“for research in prisons to be ethical, it must be interested in upholding prisoners’ constitutional right to appropriate quality care while in prison and ensure a stronger and more effective safety net for them when they return home”(p. 201). The authors therefore advocate for research with prisoners, but only when its focus is on the advancement of prisoners’ welfare. It is possible, however, that sometimes the pendulum may swing too far in the other direction and correctional officials could be overly paternalistic and deny offenders the opportunity to decide for themselves whether or not to take part in research projects (Over- holser, 1987). Issues related to informed consent and competency are to the forefront when prisoners are involved in research projects and there is a heavy burden of proof on researchers to establish that in forensic and correctional settings that offenders were under no pressure to consent, and were indeed, psychologically competent to do so. Accepting that any decisions arrived at should reflect the equality of all individuals concerned, and any solutions should generalise to similar contexts, ought to assist researchers to arrive at ethically sound options. A neglected ethical issue that emerges from a discussion of offenders’ moral status and informed consent is how much informa- tion should a researcher impart to potential participants? Should all the aims of the research and their potential applications be raised with an offender or is it sufficient to simply describe the major goals and not engage in such speculation (Chwang, 2010)? This conundrum is nicely illustrated in risk assessment research and the use of such research to inform policy in the management of sex offenders (Vess, 2009). In many western jurisdictions sex offenders are assessed prior to release from prison and if deemed to be of high risk may have strict parole conditions imposed on them or even be committed to special treatment institutions until such time as their risk is significantly reduced. For some offenders, this incarceration could amount to a life sentence (Vess, 2009). In view of the possibility of risk assessment instruments being used in ways that could have adverse effects for (harm) offenders in the future we argue it is obligatory for researchers to make this possibility explicit to potential study recruits. This obligation is directly derived from the justificatory assumptions of equality and universality, and the concept of dignity they are intended to protect. That is, researchers should state when describing a risk assessment study that one of the consequences of the refinement of the measure concerned is that it might be used in the evaluation and possible confinement (or imposition of strict parole conditions, etc.) of offenders in the future. Failure do so would arguably constitute a breach of informed consent norms and a violation of an offender’s inherent dignity and status as a moral agent. Similar points could be extended to any type of research into the etiology, assessment, and treatment of offenders. In fact, in the case of psychopathy our point holds as the presence of psychopathic features is currently considered to increase risk levels (Vess, 2009). 3.2.3. The vulnerability of offenders Third, offenders are a vulnerable population because of the fact that their core well-being and freedom interests are often neglected or put at risk when living within correctional and forensic institutions (Overholser, 1987; Regehr, Edwardh, & Bradford, 2000). The recent Institute of Medicine (2006)report highlights the degree to whichprisoners are a vulnerable population and outlines specific ethical considerations that are required for research involving prisoners as participants. For example, potentially inadequate physical and mental healthcare in prisons presents a barrier to ethical research, as research participation might reflect a desperate attempt on the part of prisoners to obtain treatment. Five objectives–that reflect the assumptions of universality and equality–are advocated for by the Institute of Medicine committee to address the ethical problems associated with offender vulnerability: 1.Expand the definition of prisoner(to include all individuals whose liberty is restricted by the criminal justice system, i.e., not just individuals incarcerated); 2.Ensure universal, consistent ethical protection(i.e., irrespective of the source of funding or correctional facility); 3.Shift from a category-based to a risk-benefit approach to research review. Currently (i.e., under the Code of Federal Regulations), research involving prisoners mustfit one of four categories: incarceration or criminal behavior; prisons; conditions affecting prisoners; or research benefiting its subjects. Switching to a risk- benefit approach will ensure studies offering no benefit to prison- ers will be excluded—for example testing of cosmetic products. 4.Update the ethical framework to include collaborative responsibility. The committee advocated that all stakeholders (e.g., prisoners, correctional officers, medical staff, administrators) should have input into research design/planning/implementation. 5.Enhance systematic oversight of research involving prisoners. Vulnerability of prisoners and offenders more generally needs to be taken into account when it comes to research into mandated treatment programs for offenders as well as ones where there is evidence of more subtle types of coercion (for a good recent review of issues related to coercion seeDay, Tucker, & Howells, 2004). The fact that offenders who are coerced into treatment may demonstrate favorable outcomes does not necessarily support such interventions because of the violation of offenders’ autonomy and ultimately dignity as a human being (Miller, 1998). For example,McSweeney, Stevens, Hunt, and Turnbull (2007) recently conducted a quasi-experimental study investigating outcomes for offenders who volunteered for drug treatment compared to offenders who were coerced (i.e., court mandated) into treatment. They found that coerced offenders reported significant and sustained reductions in illicit drug use and offending behaviors, as well as improvements in other areas of social functioning. Findings were similar for the voluntarily treated offenders, and there were no significant differences on outcome variables between both groups. The authors stated that the message from their research“is not that coercion works, but that treatment can be an effective alternative to imprisonment”(p. 486). Moreover, they emphasized that a large proportion of dependent users do not fund their drug use through crime, and that these individuals should equally have access to good quality drug treatment (Bonnie, 2006; Marlowe, 2006 on the topic of mandated treatment for addicted offenders). Despite these qualifications we have grave concerns about such research and it seems apparent that in the design of this study the potential benefits for the community and participants (well-being, beneficence) was thought to outweigh the autonomy of the participants. Such paternalism is hard to ethically justify unless the autonomy of the participants was severely impaired by drug use and therefore their competence to consent to treatment, or not, was severely undermined. There is no evidence in this study that this was the case. AusefulpaperbyCaplan (2006)underlies our concerns about coerced treatment and research that follows from it, and the requirement to explicitly keep the assumptions of universality and moral equality in mind when undertaking research with offenders. Caplan uses the analogy of a Jehovah’s Witness follower refusing blood to demonstrate the“very steep ethical hill”arguments must climb for ethically acceptable mandated treatment for drug-addicted individuals on grounds it will benefit the individual and society. In the case of a 406T. Ward, G. Willis / Aggression and Violent Behavior 15 (2010) 399–409 Jehovah Witness, refusal of a blood transfusion is binding“even if it means that the person leaves behind many children without a parent” (p. 117). Caplan clearly highlights the fundamental importance of respecting individuals’ autonomy, but points to one means through which mandatory treatment might not conflict with autonomy (& human dignity): when mandatory treatment is used to create or enable the capacity for, and exercise of, autonomy. He argues that addicts may not have the full capacity to act autonomously because their addiction “coerces their behavior”(p. 118). Accordingly, he asserts that it is possible to justify forced treatment for the timeframe required to restore an individual’s capacity for autonomy. While we acknowledge the plausibility of this argument, ethically much hangs on demonstrating that a person’s capacity for autonomous functioning is so impaired that he or she is unable to effectively deliberate about what options to pursue. In other word, asking the following question: Is the treatment and associated research really in the interests of the offender (equality, dignity) and is my answer generalizable to similar situations involving non-offenders (universality)? 3.2.4. Cultural differences Fourth, modern societies are frequently comprised of ethnically diverse groups and this fact is reflected in the ethic mix of prison populations. A glance at the proportion of indigenous prisoners around the world indicates that they are over represented in prison rates. To illustrate, as at 21 March 2010, Maori offenders comprised 50.68% of the New Zealand prison population (Department of Corrections, personal communication, 24 March 2010) compared to 14.6% of the general population (Statistics New Zealand). Irrespective of the actual number of offenders from minority ethic groups the key point is that such offenders are currently incarcerated or placed on community orders and that there are cultural differences between such offenders and those belonging to the majority ethnic group. These differences revolve around issues such as informed consent or confidentiality that researchers need to be aware of. A key issue when examining the implications of cultural diversity is to ascertain the particular level at which it is evident within a country as well as contemplating differences between cultures located in different countries (Parekh, 2006). It is typically the cultural challenges within a given society that are likely to prove most taxing for researchers and practitioners in the course of their day-to-day duties. Under such circumstances, it is imperative to keep in mind the common needs and interests of all individuals and their equal status and value. The fact of cultural diversity creates problems for researchers. For example, in some cultures the right to make decisions extends to family and even group members and therefore an offender is unlikely to want to make a decision about research participation unless he or she can consult with family and cultural representatives (Ntseane, 2009). In many prison environments this is likely to prove problematic and there is a danger that offenders’ wishes may get ignored and they may consent to research because they feel pressured or undermined. Similar points hold for issues related to privacy of research data and its uses (see above). The problem for researchers is that existing codes of ethics do not really help to address such culturally based consent, competency, or privacy questions. A third ethical issue emerging from the social and cultural under- pinnings of forensic and correctional research concerns what constitutes warranted knowledge, that is, knowledge claims that meet what are considered to be acceptable standards. It has been argued by some researchers that western conceptions of knowledge are heavily weighted towards science based inquiry methods, and experimental, and quasi-experimental approaches at that (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Mertens & Ginsberg, 2009). The worry from the viewpoint of these researchers is that claims to knowledge from other cultures that may have merit could be too easily dismissed because they do not conform in terms of procedures or substance to received standards. In western conceptions of science, typically objectivity, numerical data, the use ofimpartial methods, explicit and rigorous methods for analysing observable data are all prized and sought after. Whereas subjective, experientially based data are often seen as overly vulnerable to personal biases and, therefore, unacceptable as a basis for knowledge claims. In practice, this may mean that forensic and correctional researchers lose the opportunity for capitalizing on ways of understanding the world that have value and, therefore, run the risk of wasting available epistemic resources. Furthermore, research participants may feel that their world views and cognitive strategies are unfairly neglected or even ridiculed. Given that some treatment programs are founded on assumptions about what constitutes effective problem solving and evaluation practices, this is a concern (Ward & Nee, 2009). For example, cognitive restructuring in sex offender treatment rests upon the notions of objectivity, hypothesis testing, validity, and so on (Marshall, Fernandez, Marshall, & Serran, 2006). The challenge for researchers is to make reasonable efforts to appreciate methods of obtaining knowledge that resonate with research participants without sacrificing the advantages of established scientific procedures. 3.2.5. Virtues and vices Afifth ethical problem may occur in forensic and correctional settings where researchers may also function as practitioners and hence have dual roles (Munthe, Radovic, & Anckarsater, 2010). The difficulty in these types of situations is that allegiances formed in therapeutic relationships may exert subtle pressures on offenders to agree to participate in research projects without appropriate consultation and reflection. The fact that offenders have found therapy valuable, and taking into account the bond formed with the clinician-researcher, could combine to persuade him or her that involvement in research is a good option. The worry is that it is arguably never possible when dual relationships exist for offenders to be able to carefully consider the pros and cons of any research involvement. A related ethical problem is that of inducements for agreeing to take part in research projects in settings where“good” behavior may be viewed as contributing to early release or favorable treatment by correctional officials. Other types of inducements include offering participants attractive prison jobs, offering opportu- nities to obtain treatment for psychological problems in treatment evaluation research, when the chances of them having access to treatment otherwise would be close to zero (Overholser, 1987). These types of inducement may be especially attractive in facilities that have overly harsh and unsafe conditions. One way to avoid behaving unethically is to make sure that any actions engaged in reflect the equal moral status of the offenders involved and also generalize to similar situations involving non-offenders. In other words, the key question is would you act in the same way with participants who are not offenders and do your actions reflect their basic moral equality and dignity? The question of what character traits are desired (virtues) or not desired (vices) in researchers is partly a question of the kinds of skill needed to engage effectively in research tasks, and the broader social aims underpinning forensic and correctional research more generally. In research contexts there are knowledge related virtues such as accuracy, carefulness, orflexibility as well as ethical virtues like consideration, sensitivity, and empathy. In some research designs the ethical virtues play a dual role and beside guiding actions that demonstrate appropriate concern may also help to ensure that the data gathered are reliable and valid. For example, a sensitive empathic researcher using qualitative methods is more able to establish a trusting relationship with his or her participants when interviewing them and thereby obtain better quality data (Lincoln, 2009). In fact, any research project that involves interaction with offenders or interviews requires researchers to be able to establish a reasonably good working relationship with them. The type of qualities required depends on the specific investigatory tasks and these in turn reflect the research and broader community’s core values and research priorities. In a society dominated by a conservative social 407 T. Ward, G. Willis / Aggression and Violent Behavior 15 (2010) 399–409 justice agenda there may be little if any stress placed on offender well- being and therefore the virtues required to conduct research projects constrained by these assumptions will be different than those necessary in a culture dominated by broader humanistic commitments. The ethical problem is that the training researchers receive in formal academic training and more informal methods of knowledge transmission in conferences and workshops is likely to heavily influence their skill set and the kinds of research activities they are competent to engage in. Thus, researchers who are trained under the auspices of risk management assessment and intervention approaches may lack the orientating values and actions necessary to view and relate to offenders as fellow human beings (Denny, 2005; McNeill, 2004). Aside from the fact that a whole raft of research possibilities (e.g., transformative justice–Ginsberg & Mertens, 2009) will be excluded for such researchers, there is also the danger that they will promulgate unethical ways of regarding and treating offenders. For example, it might simply be assumed that research should also proceed on a global cost–benefit analysis and that offender concerns can always be traded off in favor of community wishes and preferences. In our view, this is an ethically, precarious position. 3.2.6. Assumptions about disorders Afinal ethical difficulty evident concerns assumptions made about disorders and offender treatability (Howells & Day, 2007). Every research project is necessarily underpinned by core assumptions about the nature of the problems and participants being investigated. In the forensic and correctional arena there is the added complication of a strong ethical overlay, that is, offenders have frequently inflicted serious harm on members of the community and are being punished as well as researched or treated. In light of what is at stake for both offenders and the wider community, it is incumbent on researchers and practitioners to examine their ethical and epistemic assumptions about offenders and their problems carefully (Ward & Maruna, 2007). For example, psychopathy has been long regarded by researchers to be virtually untreatable and as a consequence of this viewpoint, there has been little sustained research into the development and evaluation of suitable programs for individuals diagnosed as psychopathic (Howells & Day, 2007). The worry is that these assumptions may be incorrect or premature, and may instead simply express moral condemnation towards habitually violent and callous individuals masquerading as informed scientific opinion. Similar concerns could be raised about other types of offenders such as sex offenders with high levels of sexual deviancy or individuals with other types of personality disorder. In our view this point highlights the dependence (but not reduction to!) of scientific research on broader social and cultural variables and reminds researchers to always critically review the aims and reasons for their projects prior to proceeding. 4. Conclusions It does not seem possible to respond to the ethical issues outlined above by simply relying on professional codes of ethics (Ward & Syversen, 2009). For example, ethical codes are unlikely to help researchers respond to concerns about data presentation or how to balance the interests of all possible stakeholders when designing and implementing research in forensic and correctional settings. On the other hand, the concept of dignity reflected in the ability of participants to deliberate and make their own choices, and to have access to social and psychological resources that enable them to do so, can provide such guidance. Ethical principles that underpin standards in many ethical codes like those of justice, beneficence, integrity, justice, and autonomy, can be conceptually related to the concept of dignity (Ward, Gannon, & Vess, 2009; Ward & Syversen, 2009). This is possible because all persons are presumed to possess intrinsic worth and, therefore, should be treated in ways that reflect this status. That is, their core interests ought to be considered along with those of others (justice); their ownviewpoints and reasoning powers should be respected when it comes to decisions that affect them (autonomy); their standard of living ought to reach a certain threshold and ensure they have achieved a certain level of well-being (beneficence); and so on. The ethical principles that underpin ethical codes arguably are in turn justified by the high rank or worthiness of human beings, that is, their inherent dignity. This equality of moral status and high value, therefore, ought to be reflected in the way people are treated in the different arenas of their lives. Ethical thinking in forensic and correctional research contexts is complex and demanding. The reason for this complexity and level of difficulty resides in the dual nature of forensic and correctional research and practice; it is both normative and descriptive. A culture’s deep assumptions about moral accountability, punishment, the nature of moral agency, social justice and so on will inevitably color the way researchers approach their investigatory tasks. An advantage of the ethical framework outlined in this paper is that because it revolves around the concept of dignity and also on the interdependence of human beings the principles and standards associated with ethical codes appear less arbitrary and researchers are less likely to overlook subtle ethical problems. As researchers we have an obligation to keep in mind our responsibilities to all those affected by crime and never forget that the fruits of such work can have lasting and potentially devastating consequences for all. In our view, ethical forensic and correctional research is more likely to emerge out of the virtues of compassion and an appreciation of the value of all human beings. References Adshead, G. & Brown, C. (Eds.). (2003).Ethical issues in forensic mental health research. London, UK: Jessica Kingsley. Andrews, D. A., & Bonta, J. (2003).The psychology of criminal conduct, 3ed. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson. Appelbaum, K. L. (2008). 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Module 5 Assignment 1
Diversity in Research Ethics within research also include diversity among participants. Previously, a great deal of the research was conducted almost exclusively on one group—Caucasian males. Research that lacks diversity in both gender and ethnicity among participants might not be generalizable to the greater population. For example, with medical research on medications, it is not adequate to conduct research on one group exclusively and assume that the medication will have the same effects in every other group. It would be the equivalent of taking a new pill for headache knowing that the pill has never been researched on someone of your gender and ethnicity. In fact, earlier, discrepancies in the representation of participant groups were so pronounced that some medical journal editors have begun insisting that they will not publish studies on clinical trials of medications unless those studies include roughly an equal number of male and female participants as well as diverse ethnic groups. However, it is permissible to conduct research only on specific groups as long as the focus on a particular group is relevant to the topic of the study. For example, if a researcher wanted to conduct a qualitative study on the experiences of female engineers, it would be appropriate for him or her to exclude males from that research. Similarly, a researcher might want to study the roles of fathers among African Americans. Again, in that case, it would be permissible to exclude other genders and ethnicities from that particular study. When a research topic is not specifically targeted toward one particular gender or ethnicity, it would not be acceptable to exclude other groups, and efforts must be made by the researcher to recruit a diverse population in the study. In spite of the best researcher efforts, it might not always be possible to have both genders and all ethnic groups equally represented in a research sample. At the very least, all research must include demographic information on the gender and ethnicity of the participants and the researcher must acknowledge any prominent lack of diversity in the sample as the limitation of the study. In such instances, the results might not be generalizable to the groups that were not included in the study.
Module 5 Assignment 1
Ethics in Research There are two areas within research where a researcher needs to pay close ethical attention. First, a researcher must ensure that he or she is following all ethical guidelines when designing and conducting research. Second, when the researcher reports the outcome of research, he or she must do so in an ethical manner. Ethics in Conducting Research Keith-Spiegel and Koocher (1985) stated that the goal of an ethical researcher is to develop a fair, clear, and explicit agreement with participants so that their decision to participate in an experiment is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Even though Keith-Spiegel and Koocher were psychologists, this principle applies to other disciplines as well, including business and education. Historically, the welfare and dignity of the participants were not of foremost concern. There are several notorious examples of abuse. One such example is the experiments conducted during World War II in Nazi prison camps where prisoners died from lethal doses of chemicals and various levels of physical abuse. Another example is a program conducted by a hospital in Brooklyn in the 1960s in which twenty-two chronically ill patients were injected with cancer cells as part of a study to examine the body’s capacity to reject foreign cells. The patients were not informed of their participation (Heppner, Kivlighan, & Wampold, 1999). All research projects with human participants nowadays are subject to federal regulations governing research, and most institutions have an institutional review board (IRB) committee of peers to review all research proposals. The review committee ensures that no ethical guidelines are crossed during the study and that the participants are protected. For additional insights into ethical considerations while conducting research, read the following primer from the University online library resources: Ethics in Research and Publication Law & Ethics: Alerting You to the Most Frequent Problems for Mental Health Professionals written by Steven P. Frankel, fl. 1980; presented by Steven P. Frankel, fl. 1980, in Ericksonian Approaches to Hypnosis and Psychotherapy (Phoenix, AZ: Milton H. Erickson Foundation, 2011), 5 hours 19 mins http://search.alexanderstreet.com.libproxy.edmc.edu/view/work/1858396 References: Heppner, P. P., Kivlighan, D. M., Jr., & Wampold, B. E. (1999). Research           design in counseling (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Brooks/Cole. Keith-Spiegel, P. C., & Koocher, O. (1985). Ethics in psychology:           Professional standards and cases. New York, NY: Random House.
Module 5 Assignment 1
Conclusion The importance of ethics in research is not to be underestimated. Ethical standards and guidelines must be adhered to. The IRB is in place to serve as an essential system of checks and balances in order to quell the enthusiasm of any overeager researchers who might not be taking into account the ways in which their research could potentially adversely impact participants. IRB approval is required as research cannot be conducted without it. Researchers must design their studies with consideration for their participants in mind so that they will be able to obtain IRB approval. The IRB does allow deception in research but only in cases when the deception is not likely to cause undue harm and only when the information cannot be obtained another way. The IRB is primarily concerned with the protection of research participants, in particular individuals who are considered vulnerable due to physical or cognitive differences. Ethics in research also involves making efforts to recruit diverse populations so that the results can be generalizable to the larger population. While the IRB is not specifically tasked with focusing on diversity among research participants, a decision to exclude specific groups would need to be disclosed to the IRB, along with a justifiable rationale for doing so. The IRB would be unlikely to approve research that excludes a group without the exclusion being specifically related to the research topic. Ultimately, the IRB offers a layer of protection for the researcher so that in the unlikely event of an unanticipated adverse reaction from a participant, the researcher can demonstrate that he or she made good-faith efforts to conduct the research as ethically and humanely as possible.